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Many people helped me to make this project possible. 
There are too many to name. However, some contributions 
stand out. 
First, my deepest appreciation goes to the people who 
took time out of their busy workdays to talk to me. Every-
one who I aksed for an interview readily granted one. Their 
candor was invaluable. 
Second, many thanks go to Ezra Schneider. He was always 
willing to sit down and talk about various aspects of the 
water pollution program. His information and insights were 
invaluable to me. 
Finally, I must acknowledge my debt to my major professor, 
Dr. Dennis Huniak. His classes gave me the framework I needed 
to write this paper. He was always willing to sit down and 
talk about this project. He helped clarify my thinking and 
bring my ideas into sharper focus. He shares a large measure 
of whatever merit this paper has. The responsibility for 
the shortcomings is, of course, my own. 
iii 
Pref ace 
This paper grew out of an internship I did at the firm 
of Charles J. Krasnoff and Associates from the summer of 
1980 to spring 1982. As a participant as well as an obser-
ver a lot of information came my way that was useful to this 
paper. A lot of it was verbal. 
To research this paper I relied upon personal experience, 
various documentary sources, the reports of the Providence 
Journal-Bulletin newspapers and personal interviews. 
In the text there are many instances where a statement 
or sentiment is attributed to an individual without a foot-
note. In these instances it represents a statement or an 
event that I witnessed or was made to me. Standard histori-
ographical practice does not require footnoting in such cir-
cumstances. 
Everything outside my personal experience and knowledge 
has been footnoted, with several exceptions. These are in-
stances when information was given to me and it seemed pru-
eent to protect my informant. (the prime instance is my 
explanation, as given to me by a well informed source, of 
the real background to the Bucci incident) I only resorted 
to this device rarely. Even if the events recounted are 
not accepted as true, fu t would not detract from the main 
points made in the report. 
(1) 
This pa?=r grew out of an internship I did with the City of Providence 
Water Pollution Abaterrent Program Public PartLcipation Program. I ~rked 
with the staff of Clla.rles J. Krasooff and Associates, who had the contract 
to nm the program. I did mt expect to find a ma.ster' s project when I 
started ( Sumer 1980). After a few rronths I realized that there was an 
interesting story right maer my nose. I resolved to write about it. 
RhOde Island is a ·smaJ.1 state, ?=rhaps the closest thing in North Arrer-
ica to an ancient city state. '1he area of the state is c:x:mpact; rrost of 
the state's population lives in the rretropolitan Providence area. 
Because the state is so small everything is handy. " Everybody knows 
everybody or kruas sareone who does." , na.rveled one person who rroved here. 
The bureaucracy is small and concentrated. For this reason it is supposed 
by sare that Rh.ad= Island is the perfect, small laboratory to test innova-
tion in governrrent. Everything happens on a small scale; · for that reason it 
should be easy for the elected politicians to roncieve an idea and get 
it implerrented. 
I propose to turn this idea upsid= down . Rhode Island's t.rre valre is 
to disrover why things don't ~rk. It is so small its bureaucracy is can-
paritively easy to observe. Rhode Island public figures are, in the ex-
perience of this writer, fairly accessible. ( no one I approched for an in-
terview turned rre down) What makes a bold rew program, with a lot of 
high ~red support go wrong? 
(2) 
II 
In 1982 this is not a new area of study, though :rrost of players of 
real life implenentation garres have not given it much thought. This 
is a pity, for in the case of the prolonged effort to transfer the 
City of Providence's sewage treatrrent system to a state chartered re-
gional agency mistakes v;ere ma.de which, as always , had to be paid for. 
It seems to be an imnutable rule of organizational behavior that a 
shortcut taken SOire place has to be paid for in sore other place. ahl.s 
was certainly true in Providence. 
III 
'llle goal of this pafer is rrodest. There are "bYo issu=s: (l)Could 1 
the snarl over transferring the plant have been avoided? (2) Will 
the Bay Ccmnission effect substantial improvement for the large arrount 
of rroney ~le of Rhode Islan:i have invested in the Providence system? 
The first issue will be discussed in a chapter called"C:onclusive ':"on-
clusions'; the serond a chapter called " Inronclusive Conclusions." 
Toward the first end events since 1975 will be chronicled and anal-
yzed. Just 'Why has progress : toward the state takeover been so slow? As 
of April 1982 the Bay Ccmn.ission has been q:erating for a year and a 
half, hiring staff... an:i Sf€Ilding rroney, with no idea as to when it will 
actually take over the Field~s Point treatrrent plant. 
'llle pafer will show how the critics of the slow pare of progress 
should not be surprised. 'lllis study will illustrate that it was efforts 
to rush to a quick (or so it · seened), p::>litically safe solution to a 
"manufactured" crisis which created many problems in the first place. 

(3) 
The city governrrent ffi3.Y have been a ffi3.jor part of the problem; it was 
not treated as a papt of the solution. It was simply shoved aside 
while a state appointed task force ~:rked toward a solution. 
The Cianci Administration has undoubtedly sl~ things up a:msider-
abl y. Should this care as a shock? From the ve:ry beginning city offic-
ials have felt slighted. Mayor Cianci was rot consulted before the Q)v-
errror intervened. Critics of the city govemrent refuse to give the 
Cianci Administration·any credit for the things that have been aca:in-
plished, such as getting the plant running rrore or less adequately. 
The city's ornerin=ss was occassionally justified, saretirres under-
standable, but never less . than human. In short, Ma.J.iOr Cianci and his 
rren, treated shabbily (or at least they thought so) and ang:ry about it, 
reacted in a way that ~uld surprise no one who has read The Prince. 
Small injuries are the ~rst to inflict; -they inspire a desire for re-
venge that can be ~ied out. Scx:iner or later the City had to be dealt 
with. When it cane tirre to sit down an ~:rk things out Vincent Cianci, 
Like Shylock, demanded his i;x::>und of flesh. No ffi3.tter the demand was ul-
tiffi3.tely self defeating. It didn't stop Shylock and it didn't stop 
Vincent A. Cianci, Jr. 
The second part of this reJX)rt will consider the :potential useful-
ness of the Bay Comnission. Since the level of success of the Bay can-
mission will not be knJwn for sore years it is to sare extent an unan-
swerable question. However, the Bay Crnmission setup has its critics, 
rrost notably Mayor Cianci's fo:rrrer top aide, Ronald Glantz. The pros 
and cons of the Crnmist.ion will be discussed. Sare sort of new admini-
(4) 
strati ve and financial arrangerrents were needed. Was this the l:est way 
to go? Was this a price the people of Rhode Island wanted to pay? 
Would there be a trerrendous irrproverrent to justify spending all that 
rroney? These questions will be analyzed f:ran the ~rspective of a pro-
fessional planner. 
N 
But why a paper alx>ut Providence' s sewers? Most of the people I 
explail'Ed this project to thought it a boring, unattracti'2!2 pro!X)-
si ti.on. Of course, they are wrong. 
In Rhode Island alnost all the players and fringe characters in this 
game are located in and around downtown Providence. '!he key people usu-
ally attended the rronthly rreetings of City's Citizen Adviso:ry Conmit-
tee •• 
These rreetings, plus regular contact with many players, gave this 
observer a unique opp::>rtunity to keep the entire field of play in 
sight and in focus. It made for a project that was both interesting 
to ao and manageable. (for exartl'le: Save the Bay is located across the 
street f:ran the State House; down the street, in dc".;}Iltown Providence, 
is Cit:j Hall; behind City Hall are the offices of the Bay Ccmnission; 
alnost next dcx:ir are the offices of Charles J. Krasmff and Associates; 
two or three blocks away are the offices of I.Duise Durfee and Ma:ry Kil-
rnar:x; nearby are the offices of the Rhode Island Public Expenditure 
Council) 
v 
'Ihe iron triangle is one of the rrost useful cx:incepts of public ad-
(5) 
ministration theory. Briefly, it is the oonfiguration of interest 
groups, executive agencies and legislative cx:mnittees that surround 
and daninate a policy area. 'lhey may fight each other at tirres, but 
will unite to protect "their" turf against outsiders. Iron triangles 
are established with ease; once in place, h~ver, they are close to 
unbreakable. 'Iliere are a few dozen decision makers, both mighty and 
m....oek, who oonstitute the perimter of the Providence iron triangle. 
Within the triangle the goal is to dominate the present and shape 
the future. In the case of Providence sewage treatnent such critical 
qu=stions as raising revenue, hiring the proper staff and deciding 
just hCM the Bay Ccmnission' s $87 million bond issue is spent are 
issues of great interest to all. 
There are sorre in the triangle who are prepared to spend (or rath-
er, demand there be spent) a quarter billion dollars of state rroney 
to rebuild the Providence sewage treatnent system. Others in the tm.-
anglewould hotly dispr·.J.te this. It is a trerrendous arrount of rroney to 
raise, especially for Rhode Island. This sort of interplay goes on all 
the tirre in the Providence iron triangle. Enonrously expensive issues 
are being 'WOrked out. All of this goes on in alrrost total obscurity. 
Why? 
Sporting analogies are a tired devioe, but this writer will attempt 
one. This struggle is like a three sided football garre where the object 
of the match is not to score points, but to hold onto the ball- to 
rrove it where you please. With luck the side with the ball can per-
(6) 
suade~the other sides to go along. This, from the sr::ectator's view-
point, makes for a very dull ga!'t'e indeed. With ID sa::n::eboard (since 
there are no points soored as the sr::ectator urrlerstands them) and ID 
clock it is dif ficul t to understand who is winning. The game never 
really ends. 
This is why there is so little news from the iron triangle. The 
press is still very attached to the "big ball garre" approdl when re-
porting political events. Who's ahead? Who's going to win? Who's on 
the way out? What does the latest poll say? The news rredia seems in-
capable of doing serious sustained research or presenting stories 
free of :rroralising. How mudl better to report on the r::etty chiSEtling 
rife in every burea)..lCracy rather than the :rrore difficult story of 
whether the city reeds all the expensive sewage treabrent hardware _ 
sorre "WOuld have it buy ? 
The title of this project is I.Dst in the Iron Triangle. 'Ihe iron 
triangle has already been defined. What gets lost ±s the ostensible 
goal of all parties: c· cleaner N;arragar.sett Bay, with irx::reased op-
portunities for public recreation and eoonanic exploitation. A year 
and a half in the Providence Water Pollution Program oonvinred rre 
this P..nd is often far f:ran sooe key actors'. minds; the struggle 
for influenre and :EXMer often overshadows all. 
'Ihis is not to attack the sincerity of the participants. All want 
cleaner water; h~ver, they want it on their terrn.s. Sorre may think 
this cynical. That canmt be helr::ed. The reader will decide whether 
my analysis is backed by the evidenre. 
(7) 
A Brief Description of the Bay 
The Act creating the Narragansett Bay Water Quality Managerrent 
District Comnission declares in the "findings" section that " Nar-
1 
ragansett Bay may te the greatest natural resource of the State ••• " 
This is hardly an exageration, though it has tecx:ne sanething of 
a local cliche. 
When the last glacier receded 18,000 years ago2 it left behind a 
body of water that was both scenic and ridl. The "bottan aJITmUility" 
is (or has been) ridl in shell fish. 'Ihe richest teds are in the 
upper Bay are either totally or ahrost totally inaccessible to fisher-
rren dtE to pollution. Pollution of the upper Bay and overfishing have 
caused quahog yields to fall fran five million lbs. a year in 1955 to 
~ million lbs. in 1978. 3 
Fin fish are still abundant in the Bay. cne recent University of 
Rhode Island publication describes ~.a "valuable feeding and spawn-
ing ground for many species. Its high primary productivity and ridl 
tenefits provide abundant and diverse food. 114 But things have been 
better. 
In Colonial tirres lobsters were literally there for the picking. 
Large quantities of fish could be caught with a humble hook and li:.e 
anYwtiere. 5 Irrprovenents in fish catching technology increased yields. 
This drove fish c:May from the shore into deeper waters. 6 
'Ihe situation becarre so serious sare fo:rms of fishing, such as traps 
were prohibited. Trc:Mlers 31.so contributed to the declire. 7 Oysters 
(8) 
and scallops, once"abundant" in the Bay, have totally disappea:red. 8 
In the 1980's the quahog industry is descibed as"severely threatened" 
by the encroadment of pollution southward. 9 (In 1979 the "a:mdition-
al area" of the upper Bay was closed indefinitely. 9 It was only reop::m-
ed on a limited basis in 1981) 
The Bay has been a prirre state recreation area since the mid 19th 
century. Jbcky Point, in Wanvick, is the sole survivor of the anruse-
rrent parks that once dotted the Bay. At the end of the last century 
Newport was farred as the sumer playp::m of "the 400". Narragansett and 
its Pier were also nationall:1 renCMiled.10 
In our tine the 40 year eronanic lxx:m brought about by the Second 
World War has led to iricreased demands on the Bay. Many people nCM 
use the Bay for recreational boating. '!his increased recreational use 
of the Bay's waters certainly helped to pass the huge se\\er band is-
sue in 1980. 
Just hCM much of a rrenace ~:::to the Bay is pollution. No one knJws 
for sure. As the above rrentioned URI report stated " A great many peo-
ple are ronce~d about the pollution of the Bay, but when one digs in-
to the nature an:i significance of the pollution problem, the finn con-
clusions that can be drawn becare dissatisfyingly+:"e.w .... 11 
Present stan:iards say rrost of the Bay is mt polluted. Pollution is 
confined to the upper Bay. 'lhe problem there is described as"severe11 • 12 
The Providence sewage treatrrent plant at Field's Point has been a ma-
jor rontibutor to the problem, but is not by any rreans the only offend-
er. Evei:y expert this writer ronsul ted recogni res that we still do not 
knCM a great deal about what precisely pollutes the Bay. 
(9) 
Growth of Providence and Pollution Problems Before 1900 
Foger Williams, expelled from Massachusetts, landed in what is 
nDN Rhode Island in 1636. (the exact site is n=ar Gano Street, on 
Providence's East Side)1nie town of Providence was established and 
enjoyed rrodest prosp:rity. For many years the srrall town a:mfin=d 
itself to the heights on the eastern side of the Great Salt Cove(now 
filled in) and the Providence River. Not until ~11 into the 18th cen-
tury did white people take root on the other side of the River. 2 
Until the Fevolution Newport was the premier city of Rhode Island.. 
Two things changed that: the British occupation, which devastated New-
port, and irrlustrialization. Providenre took up the slack when war 
put Newport out of the trading picture. Providenre' s natural geography 
<L-lots of rivers) made it a natural industrial hub 
The rivers 9:D-S a fin= harbor also made the tCMn a natural industrial 
hub. • The rivers attracted the mills. The mills attracted the brand. 
rew steamships. With a strong base eoonany in plare J what we would 
call the service sector rroved in. The picture was a:mpleted when the 
first railroads were built f:ran Providence to Boston in the 1830's. 3 
This rreant the fo:mer backwater enjoyed (and suffered) fantastic 
population growth. Fran 1820 to 1860 the population of Providence grew 
1,000%! 4 ( the state as a whole~ a cx:mparitively piddling 154%) 5 
By 1860 Providence had a population density of 7,560 p:r square mile. 
6 The entire state average was 223 p.s.m •• 
The i.rrpact on the city was predictable. It qfilte literally stank. 7 
Dr. Edwin Snow , the City's first Superintendent of Heal th, in his 
(10) 
first year on the job (1857) depicts a city that was gag ging on its 
CMn excrement. 8 Dr. Snc:M' s knc:Mledge of the causes of disease was typ-
ical for his tirre-limited. But he had rrade the crucial oonnect:hon be-
tween disease and poor sanitation. 9 In 1857 he proposed " the a:mrence-
rrent of a general system of sewers oonstructed on tnE scientific 
principles; and the earliest abolition and prohibition of cessp:x:>ls. 1110 
By this tirre Rhode Island was the rrost industrialized state in the 
Union. 11 But no ~s ~re built, much to the detrirrent of public 
health. Dr. Snc:M believed water pollution was a rrajor cause of the 
cholera epidemics of 1832, 1849 and 1854. 12 His annual reports attest 
that for the average citizen Providence was not a nice place to live. 
Sorrething had to be done before the situation becarre dangerous . . It 
was. In the early 1880's the City sent its engineer, Sarm.El Grey, to 
study European rrethods of sewage treatrrent. That sane year (1881) Mr. 
Grey prodlilced his report and a plan to sew=r the entire city. It was 
a oorrprehensiue effort, 13 Grey rea:mrened the treatrrent plant be built 
on a stretch of land overlooking deep water. It was ~11 outside the 
settled areas and had been thought of as a potential resort: Field's 
P . t 14 01n • 
By the late 80's and early 90's -work on the system was going at a 
fast clip. (as part of the city's sanitation effort the last of the 
Cove was filled in. By the early 1890' s it was regarded as an open sew-
er. It is rr:M the site of Union Station and a parking lot)* 
* There is a shelf in BrCMn University's :Ebckefeller Library that con-
tains nothing but docurrents relating to the ongoing sewer project. 
It speaks volurres of an optimistic city on the rrove. 
(11) 
Yet all was not well. The nf:!.IV century opened and the spanking rew 
treatrrent plant a:mrenced operations. It was regarded as one of the 
finest collections of madrinery money could buy •15 State of the art 
v.e 'MJuld say. The plant was operationg yet pollution was still ter-
rible. Mayor Daniel Granger, in his inaugural address of January 6, 
190 2 said, " The 'MJrks at Field' s Point are operatin ~1 and everything 
within the ~r of the city is done to prevent the pollution of the 
River and the hartor within city limits~ It is hor,..-ever, a matter of 
much regret, that although the city has eX)?erlCled millions of dollars to 
this end, yet she is obliged to suffer fran the defilrcent of the Wocn-
osquatucket and fushassuck Rivers beyond her borders. 1116 
One objective had been accx:mplished; human waste and sare industrial 
waste was rDN disposed of via a treatrrent plant. Life on land was safer. 
The water was as bad as ever and was to stay so for a long tine. 
( 12) 
Events to the Mid 1970s 
By 1914 the Field's Point Plant was already considered 
1 in adequate. A pattern developed that was to be repeated 
for decades. There would be some unhappiness about the 
state of the city's waters, usually highlighted in the 
press. A bill would be filed. In 1919, for instance, a bill 
was introduced which would have established a metropolitan 
2 
sewer board. It was never acted upon. 
Some unsuccessful efforts got farther then others. In 
1933 the General Assembly created the Metropolitan Sewage 
Commission. This was a study group. It was to survey the 
extent of pollution, consider different options to deal with 
the situation and then put a price tag on the choices. As 
a token of the Assembley's seriousness, the Commissioners 
were given a grant to carry out their mandate. In the time 
honored American fashion, they hired a consultant. 3 
On December 13, 1933 the Commissioners released their re-
port. It did not make pleasant reading. The sanitation sys-
tern was 
of over 
was a " 
in disturbing condition. Of a Metropolitan population 
4 600,000 people at least 180,000 had no sewers. It 
5 
remarkably backwards situation". As things stood 
now conditions were "extremely undesirable ... a menace to pub-
lic health. 115 The Field's Point plant was described as "crude" 
6 
and old fashioned. 
The Commissioners offered an ambitious program to rectify 
the problems. A Metropolitan Sewage District should be creat-
ed. It would have stretched from Woonsocket to Warwick, from 
(13) 
Coventry to East Providence. This would have included 18 of 
the 39 couumities of the state. 87% of the state's popula-
tion would have been served. 7 
The Conunissioners also discussed funding. They 9roposed 
a joint effort by the state ond the federal Public Works 
Administration. 8 They must have had their eyes on the mil-
lions of dollars worth of public works grants that were be-
ginning to flow from Washington, D.C. The price tag , depend-
ing on the treatment option chosen, was anywhere from $14 mil-
lion to $84 million. 9 (in 1933 dollars) 
There are no precise explanation why nothing was done 
with the report. The money involved probably scared people 
off. For whatever reason the report was shoved on the shelf 
to gather the proverbial dust. No one seemed to care. 
Over the years Field's Point was not a big issue. The plant 
recieved two major overhauls. It became a secondary treatment 
plant in the mid 1930s. 10 In the 1950s another series of ex-
pensive rehabilitation was done. 11 The plant at Field's Point 
didn't function all that well; it didn't fail spectacularly 
either. 12 As a quiet failure it was not noticed at all. 
II 
Providence, like other northeastern and mid western cities, 
suffered a tremdous decline in its economic base after the 
Second World War. A steady stream of businisses, middle class 
and prosperous working class families deserted the city for 
the suburbs. 13 
(14) 
When these people left the tax base decreased. The city 
was poorer; this meant tax revenues stagnated. 14 To keep 
property tax levies reasonable an insidious pattern of mun-
icipal disinvestment arose. Certain city services and facili-
ties were starved of the capital needed to keep them up. 
One of the city services chosen for disinvestment was the 
, I , 15 treatment palnt at Field s Point. 
John Kellam, a planner with the city since 1950, has stat-
ncr d~ 
ed the city didAa great job maintaining the treatment plant. 
However, they always did try to keep it up, at least until 
the Administration of Joseph A. Doorley, Democratic Mayor 
from 1965 to 1975. 
According to Kellam, Doorley was a politician dedicated to 
keeping the tax rate low at all costs. His tactic was simple: 
keep replacements and repairs of worn out equipment to a min-
imum. Hold municipal salaries down. 
This sort of thing happened all over the city, but Field's 
Point was one of the worst hit facilities. Over ten years 
the plant simply fell apart. Machinery broke down. It was 
often repaired by using parts cannabalized from other brok-
rn down machines.* Kellam stated Doorley used the plant as a 
patronage dumping ground. 
Kellam believes there was at least one instance where the 
plant was deliberately sabotaged by the Public Works Depart-
ment. A long time sewage overflow was found to have been 
caused by a large block of wood stuck in one of the ''slots" 
* Many sources confirm this charge. 
(15) 
into which the water would normally flow to the plant. It 
was a perfect hit. Kellam thought this was no coincidence. 
He thought it was done to ''off load" sewage from a plant 
that could not handle all the flow into it.* 
Whatever they thought of the Cianci Administration's 
handling of the Field's Point problem, no one disputed the 
essentials of Kellarn's account. Some of the details are, of 
course, unverifiable. 
III 
1974 was an election year in Providence. Mayor Doorley 
survived an attempt by the Democratic Party organization 
to deny him renomination. Unfortunately for Doorley the 
four way primary left a lot of hard feelings. Many Demo-
crats would bolt the party in the general election. 
Doorley narrowly lost. Vincent A Cianci, Jr.,who had 
been a virtual unknown at the beginning of the year, would 
be the new Mayor. Cianci would be the first Republican to 
hold the office since 1940. One of the things he inherited 
when he took office in January 1975 was the Field's Point 
treatment plant. 
* When an electrical power system starts to fail from too 
much demand the people in charge "off load'' parts of the 
grid. In other words some areas get their plugs pulled 
to prevent the entire system from collapsing. In the case 
of Providence Kellam meant a lot of the daily sewage flow 
had been diverted to prevent the plant from being over-
whelmed. 
( 16 ) 
A Brief Digression into the Political Environrrent 
'lb urrlerstand the oontemporary p'.)litical scene in Rhode Island 
one must un::lerstant the ~·litical past. What goes on is mt only con-
sistent with the past. CUrrent events are often goverI"Ed by the past 
and the forgotten politicians of fonrer days. 
Rhode Island has a oontentiou~litical life. This is thouroughly 
.consistent with the state' s tradition. The state has rever been re-
garded as progressive; in fact its reputation has sareti.rres been quite 
disreputable 
On May 4, 1776 RtxXle Islam declared its irnep.::..ndenre fran Grea~ 
Britain. It was the first colony to do so. This is quite possibly the 
last it:rce Rhode Island was in the forefront of anything. 
Rhode Island's role in the Revolution is outside the soope of this 
paper. We will leap agead to 1787, when the Constitutional Convention 
rret and exceeded its rrodest mandate to revise the Articles of Con.fed-
eration. Rhode Island declired to send a delegation to the body that 
wrote out current Constitutioo.1 
The events that follwed are well kn:lwn. The Constitution was draft-
ed. The year 1788 SCM furious battles all over the oountry to ratify 
the new dlarter. Exrept in Rhode Island, whidl did mt bother to hold 
the neressary ratification convention. 2 
The Constitution was ratifed by the other twelve states. Elections 
were held and George Washington was elected the first President of the 
United States. Rhode" Island didn't participate. When the first Con-
gress oonvened in New York there was no Rhode Island delegation. 
Rhode Island was regarded as a "pariah" 3 Not only did the state 
refuse to join the Union, it did so for reasons President Washington 
described as ·:sharreful114 Briefly , the state had hit upon a breathtak-
ingly simple way to retire its revolutionary war debt. The state gov-
ernment issued paper rotes to retire its obligations. A creditor who 
refused to take the state's paper had his account camrelled.5 This 
gave the faction controlling the state no reason to join a federal 
goverment that had assurred the war deb:t of the states (and was paying 
off that debt in hard cash derived frcm taxes) • The new goverrrent 
would only be a nuisanre. 6 
Rhode Island finally caved in. The constitution was ratified by .the 
state ronvention in May 1790. The vote was 34-32. 7 (the paper rroney 
faction had been voted out. 'Ihe new group was ~d, in part, of 
people who held Contirental Congress prcmissary notes. The new U.S. 
Congress -wouldn't redean the notes until Rhode Island joined the Union) 8 
The prevailing political mores made refonn difficult to accanplish. 
It was as difficult as pulling alligators teeth. Scnetlires the alliga-
tor that was the state establishrrent bit back. There .,,was always a 
clique in ~r and m matter what its ideology in the regiming it was 
soon dedicated to keeping ~r and patronage. 
When Rhode Island finally sent its first delegation to Congress it 
was still ruled by the Royal Charter, granted over a rentury earlier 
by Charles II. It w=i.s to remain in effect for years (until 1843) • This · 
led to the rrost spectacular ex.arrple of the state's political elite's 
extrem9 reluctanre to dilute its oWn ~r. 
•• 
( 18) 
The General Assembly had established a $134 pro~rty requirement to 
vote. 'Ihis restricted the franchise to the v;ell off, but for :;ears 
it didn't seem to matter. When the rumblings of what is nCM called 
"Jacksonian Derrocracy" started to shake the state, at first gently 
and later massively. it mattered a great deal. 
Agitation for constitutional refonn began in the 1830's. The main 
derrand of the reforrrers was universal suffrage for all rren (usually 
all white rren) . 9 The forres in charge of state governrrent made no 
serious efforts to change the situation. As one historian has writ-
ten, the "once progressive royal charter ap~ starkly reactionary 
when oorcpared to the basic laws of Rhode Island's sister states. 1110 
Thomas Wilson D:>rr, lawyer an:1 son of a rich rrerchant, was a lead-
11 
er and finally the learer of the suffragists. When the- charter gov-
erment continmd to support the status quo the refonrers decided to 
sirrply ignore the established goverment. They elected delegates to a 
"People's Convention" ; that body drafted the cbcurrent kncMn....a.s the 
"People's Constitution." 
The "People's Constitution" was a liberal docurrent for its tirre; 
it gave the vote to all white rren. It also allo.ved for a better app:>r-
tionrrent of the General Assembly. In a referendum held by the "~ople" 
it got nearly 14,000 votes. D:>rr, riding high, declared the docurrent 
the basic law of the state. . His forres prepared to hold elections 
under the ne.v regirre. 
This tirre the Charter govennent gave sare. They did so rrost clever-
. 
ly. The charter. forres organized their CMn convention. Fran it errerg-
ed a proposal to enfranchise all native born white rren. 'lbus a \\edge 
was crafted which split D:>rr' s supporters. His natl ve born supporters 
( 19) 
had vilat they wanted. Many deserted the cause, not wanting to put them-
selves in jeopardy for foreigners. 12 
By t."lis tine I:brr had been elected "G:::>vernor" arrl an entire slate 
of officers and legislators had o::me in with him. When the charter gov-
erment decided to put down the "Peoples Constitution" once arrl for 
all the rroverrent oollapsed. The charter G:::>vermr called out the mil-
i tia, declared martial law and ordered mass arrests. He appealed to 
. 1 +: • 13 President Ty er .LOr support and got it. 
Fortunately not one life was lost during this. wnen I:brr' s band 
of volunteers was disbanded the "G:::>vermr" fled the state. (When he 
retUI:"n2d he was arrested, tried and oonvicted of treason. Sentenced to 
Li .fe at hard labor he was released within a year. In 1854 the legisla-
ture expunged his oonvictin.~and restored his civil rights. In that sane 
year, 1854, I:brr died , a broken IPan.) 14 In 1843 the present state 
consti tutionreplaced the charter. Naturalized citizens were only 81. lCM-
15 
ed. to vote after rreeting a p:rop:rty requirement. 
The decades of the 40 's and 50' s were tumultoous in the 19.!:h century 
U.S. Rhode Island was oo exception. The fonrer charter forces and their 
political heirs finally found their instrurrent to maintain pJWer:the 
Republican Party. The Republicans got an absolute lock on the state gov-
erment in the 1860's. It took a bloodless ooup to finally oust them in 
1935. 
Henry B. Anthony, publisher of the Providence Journal (then as rON 
the state's dominant n=wspap:r) created the state's Republican ma.ch-
ire. called the "Journal Ring" his crew cane to a::mpletely d:minate 
the state. Anthony used the :tXMer of his party and the ~r of his n=ws-
pap:r to p:rorrote his own poltical ambiH0ns ( he ser:ved in the House and 
( 2 0) 
the U.S. Senate) and those of others. His greatest protege was Nelson 
Aldrich* who he put into the U.S. Senate. His greatest operative was 
General Charles Brayton, who inherited the party lead=rship when 
Anthony died in 1884. 16 
General Brayton was a rrernber in good standing of the oorps of bosses 
who ran Arrerica' s political machines a rentury ago. Vfilat Brayton lack-
ed in scruples he almsot made up for in candor. (He onre opened a rreet-
ting by addressing the "Gentlerren and Fellow Machinists". He aLc:; o onre 
said "The Derrocrats are just as bad, or would 1:e if they had the rroney. 11 ) 17 
Under Brayton (who ran the state while sending Aldridl. back to the 
Senate to run the oountry) the rroral tone of public life hi,1:. bottcm. 
After Anthony died even the Journal occassionally broke with the party. 
The"Blind Boss" had raised vote buying to an art fonn.($35 a vote in a 
l 1 cti. din ) 18 . 11 ...:i~ ckraki c ose e e on, ~COJI} g to Brayton • It 1s sma wonu::r one mu ng 
article called Rhode Island" State for Sale" • 
• • 
Brayton's p::iwer base was the legislature, particularly the state 
senate. Though both houses underrepresented the UI:han areas the 
senate was by far the worst case. Each tcMn had exactly one seat, re-
gardless of p:>pulation. Brayton used his rural based machine to stay in 
p::iwer. (The Derrocrats occassionally won the House; they never won the 
senate) • 
By the turn of the rentury the Derrocrats were starting to show signs 
of a:rnpetitivness. This threat of regular Derrocratic Administrations 
caused Brayton to add a unique refinerrent to his system: The Brayton Act. 
* Nelson Aldrich was the · maternal grandfather of Nelson Aldrich 
Rockefeller. 
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'I'Pis •. law allaved the Senate to reject the goverror' s appointm:mts 
and substitute thier CMl'l. This reduced all Derrocratic GJverrors to 
18a 
total im[:x:>tence. 
The Bepublican Acendancy lasted into the 1930's even though their 
was extrerre social and r:olitical unrest. Strikes were on the front 
pages as Rhode Island's textile industry began its long decline. The 
Berrocrats were totally frustrated in their efforts to refonn the 
state's poli ti.cal arrangerrents. Then Theodore Francis Green was elect-
ed GJverror in the Derrocratic landslide of 1932. 
Green was that Rhode Island rarity; a Yankee Derrocrat. He had been 
elected GJverror late in life after a long and oot notably successful 
career in Darocratic r:oli tics. ( Green had made his first run for GJv-
error before the First World War) 19 Like all his Derrocratic predeces.rn.-
Green found himself redered powerless by the Republican's control of 
20 
the senate. 
Green and the other Derrocratic state officers were reelected in 
1934. A Derrocratic House was carried in with them. 'lhe Republicans had 
a two seat majority in the Senate. Green and his allies decided to 
take matters into their CM11 hands. When the new Assembly convened on 
January 1, 1935 they acted. 
When the Senate was called to order the Lt. GJverror, Robert E. 
Quinn directed tl'wt two Republican rranbers stand aside while the other 
Senators took their oaths. The Republicans realized sctrething was up 
and tried to oolt. This would have denied the I:arocrats a qoorum. Quinn 
directed that sare Republicans be forcibly detaired in the lodced Sen-
(22) 
ate Chamber while a recount ~ was held for the disputed seats. (This 
was perfectly legal) The r~count s~ the two Derrocrats who had con-
tested the seats were ttie real winners. They were duly sworn in and 
the Senate got down to business. Busiress was a wholesale houseclean-
21 
ing ~ state govemrent. An omnibus reorganization bill remade the 
state's organizational structure and rot incidentally fired rrany Re-
publican office holders. Ceneral Assembly control of the city of Prov-
idence, particularly the police force was ended. The entire Supreme: 
Court was fired. (The Court se:r:ves at the pleasure of the legislature. 
No Derrocrat had been appointed to it since before the Civil War.) 21 
This rreant the Dem::>cratic refonns would stand up to Court challenge. By 
the end of the long day 70 years of Republican control had been ended. 
The Brayton Mac:hire was dead. 22 
The Derocrats have rarely been out of :i;:x:M ·~r since. 1938 saw the last 
time a Republican G::>vernor was elected with OOP majorities in both 
Houses of the legislature. The House has been J:arocratic since 1940; 
the Senate since 1958. 23 
While the Derrocratic hegerrony has rernaired intact there have been 
m:xrent"l of weakness. There have interludes when Republican G::>verrors 
took office, rrost recently for three tenns in the 1960's. In 1976 G::>v-
error Philip Noel, an unpopular Derrocrat, lost to John Olafee, a pop-
ular Republican, for the Senate seat vacated by Jhon O. Pastore. In 
1980 another unpopular Derrocrat, Edward. P. Beard lost his Congression-
al seat to Republican Claud.ire Schneider. These results indicate vulner-
ability, but the Derrocratic Par-:y is still finnly in control of the 
machinery of state. 
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The .Machlle Stops 
When Vincent Cianci tcx::>k office it was only a matter of tirre 
before Field's Point failed caTIPletely. 1 Much of the plant's equip-
rrent was beyond repair; one settling tank was to becorre so clog-
qed with sludge that a man could walk across it. 2 
There is never a good tine for things like this to hap-p:m. Fran the 
city' s viewpoint, h~ver, the mid 70 's was one of the worst tirres. 
The reason: federal legislation like the Water Pollution Control Act 
of 1972 gave the United States governrrent an unprecedented interest 
in water quality. 'Ihe Enviromental Protection Agency (EPA) would 
sirrply not :pennit the city to shirk its responsibility to treat 
sewage properly. 
'Ihe EPA offered incentives to municipalities ti put things right. 
Planning grants ~re offered, as ~re oonstru.ction grants. Nationally 
these carre to billions of dollars. 3 If a polluter didn't respond to 
kindness there was the stick; the EPA could go to oourt to ask for 
fines and court orders. As a nrunicipal oorporation Providence enjoyed 
rn special imnuni ty fran EPA orosecution. 
II 
Simultaneous with the final oollapse at Field's Point, the state 
produced its Section 208 Water Quality Plan. Most of the state was 
oovered by this docurrent. Three years in the making, it identified 
the Providence sewage treatment plant as one of the very worst pol-
luters in the state. 4 This report would be heavily relied upon when 
the state finally intervened. 
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III 
By early 1977 sare very nasty chickens were caning hare to roost. 
An EPA inspection team found the plant in horrible condition. It bare-
ly functioned. The advanced decay of the plant was evident to even 
the rrost casual observer.* Conditions ~re descibed as "sickening". 
'Ihe EPA was by this tirre pressuring the city to start correcting the 
. ti' f urt . 5 s1tua on or ace co action. 
Things worsened. The state was forced to close the uoner Bay to 
shellfishing indefinitely.6 There were many unhapoy shellfishermen. 
On June 5, 1977 the EPA finally sued the city in Federal District 
Court. The agency derranded that the city live up to the oonditions of 
its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) pennit. 
The EPA and the Cianci Administration settled out of court. A con-
sent decree was signed which gave the city a final deadline of Noven-
ber 23, 1979 to get the plant at an"o?=rational level': that was accept-
able. 7 A civil penalty of $2500 per day oould he assesed the city if it 
did not carply. 
I.ate in June 1977 the city held a referen&:nn. The question was: 
should $ 8. 5 million worth of oond..s be sold to finance a repair job 
on the plant. Ma.yor Cianci SUPOOrted the rond issue. It pa..c:;sed four to 
one.
8 The city's independent effort to restart the plant was on. 
* I toured the plant four years later. While it was operating .... _ 




The city hired the finn of Charles J. Krasnoff and Associates (CKA) 
to be project managers of the repair project. That finn in turn hired 
a nurrber of sul:x::ontractors to work on various phases of the job. 1 
Throughout 1978 and 1979 they worked very hard to get the plant in 
shape. It wac; during this period the "crisis" occurred. 
With the plant oompletely non-functional during repairs t."1e only 
treatrrent sewage recieved was chlorination. 2 Greaseba.lls* were turn-
ing up: they -were very unpleasant. Places like the Edge..cod Yacht 
Club, a berth for the boats of sare of the state' s elite, was sullied. 
This awakened a vocal and affluent constituency to water quality pro-
blem.s.** For t"1e first tirre in a long tirre sewage treatment and the 
general p::>er quality of the waters of the upper Bay -were consistent 
front page items in the Providence Journal.Sare people began to beat the 
the drum for state intervention. The state, led by Dem::>Crat J. Joseph 
Garrahy, did oot seem eager to get involved. As late as July 29, 1979 
the Governor pledged state action only if public healtj). was threat-
ened. "But I don't waut to get involved in the city's business," he 
said. 3 This did not stop officials of his Administration fran public-
ly attacking the city's handling of the repair project. Nor was the 
city, usually spoken for by Mayor Cianci's top aide, the colorful Ibn-
ald Glantz, reluctant to resp::md in kind. 
* Globs o f grease congealed around solid matter. 
** One of the Providence Journal's editorial writers for instance, 
is a boat owner. 
( 2 6) 
II 
The city-state feud was exacerbated by the growing political rival-
ry between the Mayor and the Governor. Both had been :impressively re-
elected in 1978. Garrahy, with a two year tenn, was expected to try 
for a third tenn in 1980. Mayor Cianci "WOuld be his Republican oppon-
ent. This carpetetion overshadowed evertything. It still oolors the 
city's relations with the Narragansett Bay Ccmnission. 
'As the "WOrds flew 'WOIK at the plant oontinu=d. Acoording to one 
4 · 
participant the 'WOrk was "difficult" given the deterioration of the 
equiµrent. 
The war of "WOrds was fought outin the pages of the Providence Journal• 
Bulletin newspapers. Glantz, a j_a.ther unhibi ted man given to crude re-
5F0nses, "WOuld fire CMa.Y for the Mayor. The state's usual spokema:n was 
w. Edward Wood, Director of the Departrrent of Environrrental Managerrent. 
(DEM) 
For example: When the state issued an order to the city,through 
Wood, to speed up plant repairs, Glantz called up"baloney". He implied 
the ~~le thing was politically rrotivated. The Journal dutifully print-
s::-
ed the exchange. 
III 
The Journal was a major reason the pot kept boiling. Pollution of 
the Bay may not always have been front page news, but it always got 
good play. Criticisms by environrren+a/organizations like Save the Bay 
and the Coalition of Coastal Conmunities ( made up of rrost of the 
state's coastal towns) found their way into print, 'Ihe city's perciev-
ed sla-mess in putting the olant on its feet drew rrore than one scath-
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ing editorial. Editorials like "Raw Sewage Until NovenbP..r? An Intol-
erable Prospect. 116 may n:::>t sway too many people. IT did draw atten-
tion, though, which was surely the intent of the management.* It was 
a sign that a ~rfol head of steam was building up for sorreone to 
do sorrething. 
When the city clairred oonstruction oould n:::>t re speeded up the 
paper responded. "Of oourse it can be speeded up. Any oonstruction 
project can be speeded up ••• " The Journal wanted a declaration of 
errergency. The editorial ooncluded " with a genuire pollution crisis 
OCM at hand, the state's elected leaders ate duty bound to insist upon 
a crash program of speeded up repairs. They have dragged their feet 
far too long." 7 It seemed a warning to those"duty round" officials, 
particularly the Governor, that the Journal might start to aim the ed-
itorial guns at than. 
The newspaper did have a p::>int. TheSt,~~~.did oonfire itself to crit-
icism of the city. In public people like W'.x:x1 offered n:::>thing construc-
tice. They certainly did oot seem eager to take on the thankless job 
of plant rehabilitation on themselves. The C:overn:::>r ducked the issue 
whenever he oould. 
He might have successfully done so forever, for stern editorials 
ans environrrentalists' protests Cb not a gro~ll make. Then sorre-
thing occurred whidl all~d t.'1e critics to brilliantly drarnitize 
their issue. The pressure on Garrahy to act would re _irristable. 
* The Providence Journal is the only statewide newspaper. The 
Jow:nal Corporation is a major ins~te investor. It owns ~ 
radio stations, a cable television carpa.ny and is a major in-
vestor in the Biltrrore Hotel. 
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The Crisis II: The Dam Bursts 
On July 16, 1979 the final breakdown occurred. The ch~.ori:nation 
system broke dawn; millions of gallons of rCM sewage were :i;:ouring 
into tfle Bay every day. The system break.down was an accident1 , but 
that didntt matter. The city's critics roN had a live issue. The 
state had been embarrassed too, They kn=w about the breakdown for 
ten days before it was made public. 
In an editorial entitled "Narragansett Bay down the Drain" the 
newspaper called the incident a ":i;:olitical bombshell". The editors 
criticized DEM for sitting on the news; once again the city's slCM-
ness was denounced. In both instances the paper wanted to knCM: Why?2 
G:>vernor Garrahy' s atterrpts to keep out were bee"""~ :i;:olitically 
untenable. On August 1 the story got pranirent roverage on pages one 
and three. Page one discussed the newly issued Section 201 facilities 
plan done by Anderson-Nichols, an engin=ering finn. This docurrent 
rovered the price of repairs for the entire Providence system. Pran-
inent roverage was given to the price tag: $242 million. 3 Page three 
re:i;:orted the Conservation Law Foundation wanted a special master to 
take over the plant. In the sarre story Da.vid Strauss, of the Coalition 
of Coastal Cormruni ties, also sup:i;:orted a special master, citing 
. 
"the lack of sorreone taking charge. 114 
Tnrly Coxe, executive director of Save the Bay, by far the state's 
rrost promi.rent environmental group, wanted SOire single "authority" to 
have rontrol of the plant and its system. 5 
( 29) 
II 
The Journal called the breakdown a crisis. It certainly reported 
it as one. On August 2 the Jounial quoted Dennis Nixon, URI profes-
sor and lawyer for the Shellfishenren's Association, as saying, "the 
fact that we tonight are prepared to write off the upi:er Bay for a 
hundred years is a pretty drastic step. 11 6 This was pretty strong stuff. 
For its _part, the city had trouble defending itself. Ronald Glantz 
(who this writer can safely say was oot the rest man for the job) work-
ed on the best defense is offense principle. Glantz attacked (and to 
this day attacks) the political rrotives he thought were J:ehind the 
criticisms. 7 
III 
The Coveroor finally acted: Garrahy announced he would appoint a 
task force of politicians, professionals and environrrentalis_ts to 
study the problem. 8 The Coveroor remianed cautious. "Perhaps a new 
authority need be created. Perhaps it is tinE to review the possibil-
ityof a statewide approach to all the stat-e's sewage treatrrent pro-
blems • .,lo The Coveroor's staterrent was not enthusiastic. Garrahy had 
decided to appoint this task force without consulting the city. 
This becarre known the next day, when Cianci released his own plan. 
He wanted an independent city agency patterned after the highly re-
garded (and autonarous) Providence Water Supply Board. The MaiilQr re-
quested the General Assembly (both houses of which have huge Derrocrat-
:i:c rra.jorities) enact the required legislation at an upcoming special 
(30) 
session.11 Cianci then revealed that Garrahy hadn't ronsulted him 
on the task force, though he claimed he didn't think the Coverror 
was trying to undercut him. Cianci ended up by saying he didn't want 
the plant to bea::xre a"political football 11 • 12 
IV 
By August 12 the Journal was speculating whether the sev.er pro-
blems would bea::xre a 1980 campaign issue. The political rolumist 
of the day revealed that the task force had teen a rush job; that_ ex-
plained in part Cianci's mt being ronsulted~ The rolumist also 
quoted W. Edward Vkx:xi, of DEM. Wood was giving the party lire. "Sud-
denly two ?E=ars after he berones Mayor it goes downhill and goes aa.m.-
hill and st6ps operationg. So I don't agree it's a 100 year old pro-
blem he's inherited." 13 
Wood's staterrent was hard, not to say dishonest. Cianci did inherit 
.. 
a bad situation. Wood's staterrent, a:ming as it did fran a prominent 
rrernber of the Darocratic Administration, derronstrated how the issue was 
beroming politicized. The tone and temper of the exchanges shCM that 
both s~des saw the issue as dangerous. 
At this point of high tension both sides backed off, at least in 
public. The Coverror and the Mayor had a brief neeting. They agreed 
to work together to deal with the water pollution problem. Despite 
his new task force the Covermr agreed to support Cianci's plans for 
a city authority. The Mayor was appointed to the Covermr's task 
14 
force and agreed t6 rooperate with it. 
* Two and a half years later Fonald Glantz is still very annoyed 
by this. 
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Garrahy announced the final rorrp::>sition of the task fora=. It 
was to be chaired by Louise Durfee. Miss Durfee had several cred-
entials for the job. She was a lawyer and an environrrentalist (a 
founding rraTiber of Save the Bay) and a Derocratic politician. The 
taciturn Durfess is rot a wcrnan to be trifled with; her presenre 
gave the task force credibility with lx>th environrrentalist and pol-
iticians.15 
House Speaker Edward Manning had already promised the Mayor his 
refonn package would be taken up.16 On August 22, 1979 the Assembly 
leaders anoounced a special session would be held on September 20. 
True to their word it was annmmred that the Mayor's bill w::iuld be 
one of the things ronsidered. 17 
v 
However, no bill cane frcm the city for the General Assembly to 
ronsider. It lx>gged davn over a dispute about administrative struc-
ture. The Mayor wanted a brand rew city agency; a number of City 
Council Ds:rocrats wanted the plant given to the Providenre Water 
Supply Board. 18 An i.rrpasse developed. This bothered both the Mayor 
and the Governor; they were eager to get sorre sort of refonn pro-
gram rolling. 19 On SepteTiber 19 the Journal reported no agreement 
could be reached between the Mayor and the City Colillcil. No bill 
w::iuld go to the special session. 20 
This left the field to the Goveroor's task fora=. No action re-
quiring Asserrbly approval was going to be ronsidered until the 
legislature convened for its January session. As far as this issue 
was conrerned, the Cianci Administration was to be shoved first to 
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the sidelines, then to the fringes. 
VI 
The Task Force got right into its work. M=anwhile the city and 
state oontinued their front page fencing. The state DEM oontinued 
to attack the city's c::arpetence to run the plant. At one :point DEM 
suggested a private finn manage Field's Point. 21 Just where this 
private finn oould be found DEM didn't say. 
AfeN days later the city and state accussed each other of stal-
ling. Once again the city's c::arpetence was called into question. 
This did not help the plant's staff. They felt they were being set 
lip to be scapegoats.* 
On Novanber 9, 1979 the Dem::>cratic Attorney-General Dennis Ibb-
erts sued the city to enforce chlorination requirerrents. Since no-
l:X>dy suggested the city was willfully dunping raw sewage Robert's 
action was a bit superfloous. Glantz called Fobert's action":politi-
cal" and wondered aloud why the sta:f-..e didn't go after problems in 
Derrocratic oontrolled Wru:wick and Newport. " 'Ihey are like the In-




It was finally time to restart the plant. On November 19, 1979 
Mayor Cianci did so. 23 It was four days before the court ordered 
* One well infonred person told rre these criticisms did have sare 
basis. A "tiny" mimrity of workers oouldn't or wouldn't do 
their jobs. He thought it fair to point out the staff ~rly 
paid, criticized often and held in lc::M esteem. 'Ihere was a ser-
ious rrorale problem at the plant. 
•• 
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deadline. There was still a way to go before the plant was work-
ing well. The bianass, the collection of microbes that feed on sEM-
24 
age and ITEke it safe to discharge, was rot ready. It was plain 
the city would not be in ccrrpliance with the court order; this 
"WOuld put the city back in court in 1980. It "WOuld be sorre time be-
bore Krasnoff and the contractors got the plant to 'WOrk consistent-
25 
ly well. 
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Toward a Bay Canission I: Was State Intervention Justified? 
Once the city failed to care up with a plan for an autonorrous 
city agency the responsibil ty for proposd.·ng reform was left to 
the Gove:rn::>r' s Task Force. W:>rking through the auturm and early 
winter they strove to produce a report that could be acted upon 
at the General Assembly's January session. The questions are: was 
their "WOrk needed? Were their eventual recormendations desirable? 
According to three kef task force rrembers this writer interview-
ed* there was no question of. the city being allowed to maintain con-
trol over the plant in any form. None of them, fran the blunt Louise 
Durfee to the rrore diplcmatic Gal:y Sasse had any faith in the city's 
ability to rranage the plant or maintain it properly. All thought 
the reality of the city's poor tax base also precluced raising the 
capital needed for the program they envisioned; all ~re critical 
of the city's rranagerrent practices. They ~re skeptical things "WOuld 
get better soon. 
Aides to the Mayor*tfor their part, ~re critical of the Task 
Force and suspicious of its rrotives. Ronald Glantz was particularly 
outspoken on this point. Poth made it clear they thought the Task 
Force was not really interested in "WOrking with the city towards a 
settlerrent which reflected ~11 on the city and state. Poth sides 
are right. 
The cri ticism.s of Ronalc. Glantz and R:>bert Chase have sare fac-
* Loi1ise0 r>urfee, Chair of the Task Force; Mary Kilmarx, Chair of 
the General Asse.nbly Joint Comnittee on the Environrrent;and 
Gary Sasse, Executive Director of the Rhode Island Expenditure 
Council 
** Ronald Glantz and Robert Chase 
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tual basis. The task force rrenbers interviewed all agreed t.l-ieir 
minds had been made up on several points: (1) sorre sort of state 
agency should take over the plant; (2) for whatever reuson the city 
had done a miserable job in the past, was not doing a good job 
presently and would probably botch up the future, because ( 3) the 
city did not have the wealth to build a DEM plant and maintain it 
acoording to the Section 201 Facilities Plan. (Expenditure of a 
quarter billion dollars might be called for) 1 
All three tasi>. force rrenbers criticized the city for rot cooper-
ating with the task force. The city had very little to do with 
shaping the policy rea::mrendations of the group. Guy Sasse oould 
rot rerrernber the narre of the Mayor's man on the Task Force. (Joseph 
Rotella, a city lawyer) ; 2 He did rerrember that Rotella said and did 
very little. 
Sasse criticized the "lack of policy inputs" from the Mayor. Miss 
Durfee thought no one "was on top of things" at City Hall. (This 
was a frequently and widely heard ongoing criticism of the Cianci 
Administration's handling of this issue} 
Robert Chase, who represents the Mayor on the day to day affairs 
of the Water Pollution Program, was in turn critical of the whole pro-
cess which brought the task force about. The city didn't play much of 
aa ro~_e because the city's wish for an independent city agency was 
flP:t oonsidered. The lack of respect task force :rrembers had for: the 
city govemrent was very evident during interviews. Given this there 
is still a question: Once it becarre obvious a state takeover was 
in the works, why didn't the city cooperate to assure an orderly trans-
fer'? The question is still unanswered.It is certain the Task Force 
( 3 6) 
would have weloom3<1 the city's participation towards this particu-
lar end. 
Glantz and Chase oonsistently qt;estioned the rrotivations behind 
the creation of the Task Force and its recormendations. 'Ihis is an 
inportant "theITe. for whatever the truth of the matter, the ).1elief 
in a desire on the part of the Derrocratic Goverrnr to embarrass the 
Republican Mayor (and prospective opponent) affected the actions of 
the Ma.yor and his rren. 
As it happens, the position of Chase and Glantz does have sare 
validity. Mary Kilrnarx, at the tirrE a Derrocratic State Representa-
tive fran the affluent East Bay Connrunity of Barrington, stated 
that the Garrahy-Cianci rivalry had "sorre" influence over the Task 
Force procedeings. She had no doubt things would have gone ItRlch 
srroother had there been a Derrocratic Mayor in City Hall. This did 
not change the fact she was there primarily to deal with a dis-
turbing problem: the oontim:ed degradation of the waters of Narra-
gansett Bay. She did admit though, she enjoyed the"bonus" of being 
able to soore sare political points off Cianci.* 
Robert Chase, by way of defending the City Administration, says 
the total picture must be oonsidered. To Mayor Cianci, an · ambitious 
man, the plant was just one of many issues- and mt one many of his 
oonstituents cared about. Why should an arnbitous politician like 
Cianci get too far ahead on an issue that oould do little for him 
at best and hurt him at worst (because of the rroney involVed)? It 
is easy for people on the "outside" with ver:y narrow oonstituencies 
to please to demand action. It's another thing altogether for an 
* Ronald Glantz was particularly unflatter.ing tcMards Mrs.Kilrnarx. 
He depicted her as a tool of the Govern:>r and sais "now she has 
a job with the state"(the Public ut+_lities Ccmnission). The ver:y 
plain irrplication was that it was her payoff. 
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embattled big city ma.yor to do so. The plant was an "East Side" 
issue (the city's rrost affluent reighbcn:hood) and mt a big con-
rem to rrost of the city. 
Chase and Glantz saved their roughest oorments for the Providence 
Journal, who they believed trurrl!;:ed up a -phony crisis to force a state 
takeover. When the :chlori.nat±oil' system broke down reconstruction was 
already well under way. All that was needed was a little patience * 
and the situation ~uld have been well under control. 'Ib this day 
they believe the Journal does mt give the city the credit due it 
for getting the plant running "as well as it is capable of running". 
This was the soundest argurrent put forth by the Cianci Administra-
tion. 'llle city did get the plant going. The "crisis" had long sinre 
passed by late 1980. Very few people have given the city or its con-
tractors proper credit for the job. 
Chase and Glantz believe the city was made a whipping lx>y by a 
very narrow constit1E11cy of environmentalists (aided by opp::>rtunis-
tic politicians) who fourrl it a dramatic issue to rally aroun:L To 
this end the city's pollution problems were consistently misrepres-
ented and the city's accorrplishrcents ignored. Both wanted to kncM, 
by way of a rhetorical question, hON an 1899 rrodel s·~wage treatment 
plant could be expected to function up to 1980 standards in any event. 
This view is apparently shared by the Mayor. This writer heard the May-
or defend hisdAdministration's c:xnpetence, pointing out the city nvw 
had a "brand reN M::xiel T" to work with. 
* 
r.bst critics of the city inte:rviewed ~uld, if pressed, concede 
By late 1980 the plant was functioning ~urprisingly well, often 
excedeing 1983 EPA pollution guidlires. 
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the physical limitations of the plant. This, however, tend-
ed to be glided over quickly. None had a great deal of sym-
pathy for the Mayor's political problems. Politicians like 
Mary Kilmarx did seem to have a little. Trudy Coxe had none 
at all. She was very harsh, claiming that Save the Bay had 
been"rebuffed and lied to", forcing her and like minded peo-
ple "to take off the gloves". When asked to comment on Mr. 
Chase's defense of the Mayor she called it "shortsighted 
and narrow". As to the problems of running a big city she 
said, "Tough. Buddy wanted to be Mayor." 
Unlike most other people, Miss Coxe wouldn't accept the 
city's relative poverty as a defense for its shortcomings. 
"Where were the user fees?" she asked. Robert Chase would 
no doubt point out the user fees were another hot issue. 
They may be desireable, but who wants to be the politician 
who gets out and leads the way? Trudy Coxe would no doubt 
say "tough".)* 
Chase admitted the city had made mistakes. They were, in 
his view, mostly in the realm of public relations. The city 
was not "prepared" for the breakdown as well as it might have 
bee. After the breakdown, which was depieted as a catastrophe, 
the city did not do enough or could not do enough, to affect 
the perception that the city government was totally inept. 
On the other hand both Glantz and Chase offered an argu-
ment that was rather disingenuous, n ot to say silly. Both 
* This writer's observation is that Miss Coxe is not very 
very sympathetic to the much put upon Providence tax-
payer. At a Citizen's Advisory Committee meeting in the 
swmner of 1981 the subject of Providence's taxes arose. 
A group of taxpayers, led by Mrs. Rikki Sweeney was fight-
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downplayed the importance of the fecal matter dumped 
into the Bay as a result of the plant breakdown. Both 
claimed that the heavy metals passing through the system, 
into the plant (thereby disrupting the biomass) and out 
into the Bay bottom muck was a bigger problem. (the heavy 
metals mostly come from the state's jewelry industry). 
Heavy metals certainly are regarded as a major source of 
Bay pollution. Yet .to pretend that raw sewage is not a big 
problem when it is dumped into public waters is a grotesque 
position.* 
II 
The establishment of a state-city task force with some 
influential members to examine Bay pollution problems was 
a long overdue development. Some sort of reform was needed, 
as the Mayor himself had already admitted. 
However, the city does not feel it was well treated. This 
certainly got things off to a bad start, for their feelings 
in this instance have some justification. There is still 
this problem: Why couldn't the Mayor get together a pro-
posal for the city agency he claimed to want? This question 
is very pertinent as the current administrative arrangements 
have caused the Mayor much grief. Having lost the chance 
for a city agency why didn't the Cianci Administration bow 
ing a special extra tax levy voted by the Providence City 
Council. Miss Coxe at one point asked, "Who is this Mick-
ey Sweeney anyway?" . 
* Ronald Glantz told this writer, "Shit doesn't hurt fish. 
Fish digest it." 
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and cooperate completely with the task force to get rid 
of a large, expensive albatross? 
At least one individual close to the situation thinks 
the Mayor just doesn't care very much about the sewer plant. 
In this observers view, this explains the inattention on 
the city's part when it came time to work out a transfer 
of the plant. If Cianci really is indifferent towards the 
sewer system problems and the attempts to work them out, he 
then deserves all the bad press and political fallout he 
has had showered on him in the last two years. 
III 
The Governor and his task force may have been pressured 
by a bogus crisis. There is certainly evidence to support 
that view.*The city, however, did not take advantage of the 
opening the Governor left it: his offer, backed by the leg-
islative leaders, to support a new city agency if the city 
government could only get itself organized and produce a 
bill to enact. 
Governor Garrahy did not intervene merely to embarrass 
the Mayor. He did nothing until forced to. He was not en-
thusiastic when he finally did involve himself. He certain-
ly did not cornrnitt himself to a state takeover of the plant 
when he appointed the task force. He should have called the 
Mayor and talked to him before he did it, but that's another 
matter. 
* One State House hand contacted (and who prefers anomin-
ity) says it's a common belief around the State House 
that the Governor is unduly sensitive to pressure from 
the Journal.Of course very few of these people ever get 
pressures by the "ProJo" themselves 
( 41) 
When the city failed to act the Governor was left with 
little choice but to act himself, even if his response was 
hasty. That was only a basic response to political reality. 
He did his best to avoid it. The Governor hit the ball back 
out to the city as quickly as he could; Mayor Cianci and 
his men botched the catch miserably. 
( 4 2) 
Toward a Bay Commission II: The New Order Takes Shape 
It has already been noted that the Governor's task force 
had no doubt they would opt for a state takeover of the 
Providence sewage treatment system. Having made this broad 
policy choice several questions remained to be answered: 
What was the extent of the pollution problem? What effect-
ive, affordable measures could be taken to combat pollution? 
What would be the format of the new agency? How much state 
support would be offered and how would the money be raised? 
II 
The task force, relying heavily on research done for 
the Section 208 Water Quality Plan, found major degrada-
tion by both "conventional" and "unconventional" sources. 1 
Conventional pollutants are BOD5 , suspended solids, settl-
able solids and coliform bacteria. 2 
BOD5 is biological oxygen demand. Simply put, when cer-
tain substances are dumped into water they stimulate biolog-
ical reactions which use up the dissolved oxygen. If enough 
dissolved oxygen is used the water "dies", i.e., it cannot 
support most marine life. The higher the BOD 5 loading the 
worse the problem. Settleable solids and susoended solids 
are just that- material that either settles out to the bot-
tom or remains suspended in the water. 
Coliform are organisms used to measure for undesirable 
bacteria. The presence of coliform, harmless in of itself, 
is an indicator of potential health problems if the count 
3 is high enough. 
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Unconventional pollutants tend to be things like metals 
from industrial operations and urban runoff. According 
to one University of Rhode Island marine scientist, runoff 
from the streets is loaded with metals and chemicals. 4 
Municipal treatment plants on the Bay were found to con-
tibute 75%of BOD 5 and 69% of suspended solids. Of that amount 
the Field's Point plant ultimately contributed 62 % of the 
BOD 5 and 46% of the suspended solids.s 
No figures were given for unconvential pollution sources; 
no figures are available. It is a very new area of research. 
Though there is no useful quantified data available a pres-
entation given by Dr. Eva Hoffman, of URI, left no doubt 
these sources of pollution do a lot of damage. Both point 
source (specific outflows into a body of water) and non-
point sources (runoff from stree~s and fields; used motor 
oil dumped into sewers) contribute unconventional pollution. 6 
The state DEM had divided the Bay into five di fferent 
segments. Their waters were classified as follows: 
Class SA: suitable for shellfishing and all sea water 
uses 
Class SB: suitable for bathing, shellfishing after de-
puration and fish habitat 
Class SC: suitab7e for fish habitat with good aesthetic 
value 
The task force found that if present conditions persisted 
only the waters of Segment Five (the lower Bay) would be open 
to all recreational and economic uses. 8 Shellfishing would 
(44) 
9 
not be allowed in Segment four. No shellfishing or bathing 
could be allowed in Segments One through Three; even if the 
entire Providence facilities plan the under consideration 
were implemented this would remain true for first three 
segments.lo 
If the Providence facilities plan were to be completely 
implemented the main impact would be on recreational boat-
ing, fishing and aesthetics. The improvement here would be 
general. Shellfishing would be improved; more beds could be 
opened.* 11 
III 
Any solution would be costly. Total spending requirements 
for upper Bay treatment plants and sewer lines were pegged 
at $874,135,000. Providence alone would need $226,000,000.12 
Task force member John O. Pastore, a former U.S. Senator and 
esteemed elder statesman*' called the figures"amazing". 13 
Amazing or not the numbers were certainly intimidating in 
a small state like Rhode Island. 
For several reasons the task force members concluded the 
cash requirements were simply beyond the capacity of the 
City of Providence. Even assuming a liberal funding situation 
in Washington, the quarter billion dollar Proviaence facili-
* 
** 
Ironically when conditions improved enough in 1981 to 
allow some long closed upper Bay shell fish beds to 
open the resulting glut depressed the market. The shell-
fishermen were very unhappy about this. 
In 1964 Lyndon Johnson toyed with the idea of making 
Pastore his Vice President. 
( 4 5) 
ties plan would take four years to implement. 14 A more 
realistic view of future funding possibilities meant a 
twelve to fifteen year program was more likely~ 5This could 
be brought about if construction grants were maintained at 
1980 levels. 16 This was an uncertain prospect in late 1979, 
when the Reagan Administration was just one of Jimmy Carter's 
bad dreams. 
The task force thought some kind of fiscal plan allow-
ing for an acceleration of the four phase 1979 Providence 
facilities plan was in order: 
" In light of the continuing degradation of 
" water quality in the upper Bay, the Task 
Force finds that a funding program to ac-
celerate the implementation of ~7ojects to 
clean up the Bay is essential." 
The task force recommended, given the likelty funding 
constraints, that priorities be established. The project 
should be implemented in separate, independent stages one 
building upon another. This was unavoidable given the lim-
ited ability of both the state and the city to produce cash. 
The task force found that an attempt to implement the 
facilities plan quickly, with a 90%/10% state/federal split 
of funding would lead to a gigantic bond issue of $196,000,-
000.18 This would be a large amount in any state; in Rhode 
Island it was staggering. 
The task force found this single bond issue would double 
the state's bonded debt. 19 This could do tremendous damage 
to the state's credit rating. The political obstacles to such 
(46) 
a bond issue were tremendous. As a practical matter the 
task force did not find asking for that much money a real 
option. Under that plan the city alone would have to come 
up with $21,800,000. 20 
IV 
The task force stated its lack of faith in the city's 
ability to operate and maintain the plant. After reciting 
the by now standard litany (badly operated, poorly main-
tained, inept staff, etc.) 21 they found the job beyond any 
one city. It was a regional problem which cried out for a 
regional solution. 
the task force made it clear the city Department of Pub-
lic Works should have been relieved of the responsibility 
for theplant a long time ago. A brand new administrative 
agency was needed. 22 A regional agency modeled after the 
Blackstone Valley District Commission was suggested. An 
agency of this type could manage the reconstruction projects, 
levy user fees, employ a sound management with a higher cal-
ibre of employees, promulgate regulations and wield enforce-
ment power. "Equitable representation" of affected interests 
was necessary. Possibly the new agency could eventually 
merge with the Blackstone- Valley Commission. 23 
v 
Having established a data base and drawn some conclusions 
(47) 
the task force proceded to recommendatio~s . Broadly, there 
were three items of immediate consequence. 
First, the task force called for the creation of a state 
chartered agency similar to the Blackstone Valley Commission. 
It would represent all interested communities and would al-
24 
so include citizens and interest groups. 
Second, the task force called upon the state to issue 
$81.7 million worth of general obligation bonds to finance 
and accelerated construction schedule. The task force sug-
gested the state and the new agency split the amortization 
costs on a 90/10 per cent basis. 25 
Third, the task force wanted the money used to implement 
Phase II of the four phase facilities plan. (Phase I had 
been the interim repair project financed and implemented 
by the city). Phase II called for a major reconstruction 
of the plant at Field's Point and construction of Combined 
Sewage Overflows 2 and 9 (CS02 & CS09)* an extensive improv-
ment of the plant combined with the construction of the CSOs 
were evaluated on a cost/benefit basis. It was found a major 
26 improvment would result at an affordable cost. 
The task force asked a bill be drawn up, presented to the 
Assembly and enacted quickly to implement the above proposals~ 7 
* CSOs are subplants designed to hold and treat the excess 
water generated by storms.These waters can overwhelm a 
combined system (a system where the storm sewers and the 
sanitary sewers are one and the same) like Providene's 
during a major rainfall. The overflows caused by storms 
are a major source of pollution of Providence area waters. 
(48) 
VI 
How were these numbers arrived at? According to Gary 
Sasse, whose organization acted as staff to the task force, 
they came out of a computer generated hat. Once a bond 
issue was decided on the State Budget Officer, John Murray, 
was called in. His agency cooperated with the task force 
completely. This was critical for the Budget Office's sup-
port was vital to passage. As the guardians of the state's 
fiscal integrity they could sink any big spending program 
quietly and behind the scenes if they chose to. 
Working together Sasse and Murray determined the minimum 
amount the state could contribute and still be large enough 
to but a significant improvement in water quality. After 
some work with the budget office computers the task force's 
figures were arrived at. This was an amount which could buy 
better water, be a bearable debt and have a chance at politi-
cal acceptability. 28 
VII 
By late January the essence of the task force recommen-
dations were becoming public. 29 Cianci reiterated his sup-
port for some kind of regional agency. 30 In February the 
task force released its report. Gar~ahy backed it, making 
its approval a major priority of the 1980 legislative ses-
sion?1 The city administration was strangely silent, save 
for Mayor Cianci's faintly ominous statement that he wouldn't 
"give the plant away" to any new agency. 31 
(49) 
The Grand Coalition and a Nonissue Issue 
The arrival of 1980 meant the eagerly awaited struggle 
between Cianci and Garrahy for the State House could form-
ally begin. Both the professionals and those who politics 
as a spectator sport expected an engrossing, close contest 
between two popular and experienced politicians. The bill 
to create the Narragansett Bay Water Quality Management Dis-
trict Commission and commit the state to selling an $87 mil-
lion bond issue to finance it was also expected to be con-
troversial. The state had never attempted anything on this 
scale by itself. 
Neither expectation proved correct. The campaign was 
a dud. The opposition that might have been expected toward 
the bond issue never materialized as it rolled to victory. 
II 
The Governor was as good as his word. Louise Durfee, work-
ing closely with DEM and the Governor's staff drafted a bill 
for introduction into the General Assernbly.l A Rhode Island 
Governor of the Democratic Party will usually get his way 
with the Democratic Assembly if he absolutely,positively in-
sists. He did insist; this meant the bill would eventually 
pass. 
The Governor was no doubt motivated to serve both the pub-
lic interest and his own poltical interest. The Bay seemed 
a mess; something had to be done about it. The Field's 
(50) 
situation was a ''bombshell". With vocal environmentalists 
and the state's leading newspaper supporting a state take-
over it was a politically attractive thing to do. The issue, 
in short, could be defused. 
On March 14, 1980 Senator Joseph Gendron, the Majority 
Leader, rose from his seat to introduce the Governor's bill. 
It was given the number SOS 2877 and assigned by the Presi-
dent of the Senate to the Joint Committee on the Environ-
2 
rnent. The bill was on . its way to passage. 
On March 20 the Joint Committee referred the bill to the 
House Finance Committee. A Senate bill was, in effect, sent 
to the House without the usual formality of Senate passage. 
All legislative staffers contacted thought this procedure 
was "very unusual". 3 
On March 25 the Finance Committee reported the bill out 
onto the floor of the House. Only the elected representatives 
had seen the bill. The committee professional staff had noth-
ing to do with it, 4 This left no doubt the decisions regard-
ing this bill were corning down "right from the top'' (says 
one source who prefers not to be named) That same day the 
House sent the bill back to the Joint Committee, chaired by 
Mary Kilrnarx, where it was redrafted. 5 It took the Joint 
Committee a month to accomplish this. 6 
During this time the Cianci Administration made its 
position known regarding the new commission. It did not 
support it. Robert Chase and Ronald Glantz made the short 
trip up to the State House to testify. Glantz denounced the 
( 51) 
bill in very strong terms. Glantz claimed the bill was 
too much of a rush job. A solution was being offered when 
we hadn't defined the problem. Glantz called the program 
"an absolute fraud, based on a lie."7 
Mrs. Kilmarx' attitude was probably typical of her leg-
islative colleagues. She was very much irritated and offend-
ed by Glantz. She thought the city had had ample opportun-
ities to shape the Garrahy program. It was too late to 
junk the work done and start from scratch. 
Her stand was probably justified. Glantz did come in 
and make "unreasonabl~ demands". Most notable was his wish 
that the city take over the entire Providence system, in-
cluding the "laterals"~ (laterals are the individual tie 
ins to the system) This was something the state was not pre-
pared to do. 
Two years later Glantz still ridiculed the whole Bay Com-
mission. He didn't think it would accomplish much. He called 
it a "joke" and "an open sewer into which to pour money."9 
These latter statements are more invective than criticism. 
Yet some of his complaints should be considered. It was a 
rush job. There was no~ much study. All participants agreed 
the Assembly rushed it through because the Governor demanded 
it. Gary Sasse states there was no need for a thorough leg-
islative review; the "administrative evaluation" had been 
sufficient. More review by the Assembly "would have been re-
dundant"! Maybe so. A case can be made,however, that the 
(52) 
General Assembly abdicated its responsibility to be skep-
tical of the programs of the Executive. 
III 
The city's position didn't count for much in the State 
House. "Buddy" Cianci was as influential up there was a 
Cardinal in the Kremlin. 
In any event, prolonged opposition to the Bay Commission 
and the bond issue was not a tenable position according to 
Cianci's men, Glantz and Chase. The environmental groups 
were as unforgiving as they were tenacious. The Providence 
Journal was firmly behind the new Commission. With the 
popular Joe Garrahy and his dominant party behind it too 
the pressure was too much to resist. It was an "apple pie 
issue"9 that could not be bucked without risking serious 
political trouble. This meant that even though Ronald Glantz 
thought the bill "sheer stupidity" that "would never work" 
Mayor Cianci ended up supporting the takeover. This meant 
the front supporting the bond issue was a seamless amalgam 
of interest groups, business, the news media and both major 
parties. The Grand Coalition was born. 
IV 
On April 27, 1980 the bill began the sprint to enactment. 
The Joint Committee reported the bill out to the House once 
more. By this time it was now called 80S 2877 Substitute "A" 
( 5 3) 
The bill had been amended somewhat in committee, but the 
essentials of the task force recommendations remained; at 
least one provision of the new bill was drawn with parti-
san considerations in mind. 10 
On that same day the House once again sent the bill to 
House Finance.Once again the professional staff never saw 
it. 11 The Finance Committee reported out the bill on May 7. 
By this time the General Assembly was in the throes of fin-
al adjournment. On May 8 the bill was placed on the Calen-
dar for action the next day. 12 
May 9 was the last day of the session. The viii flew, 
passing the House 66-0.The bill was taken across the Rotun-
da to the Senate. It was passed in concurrence, a process 
which surely didn't take more than a minute. 13 The vote 
was 45-0. The bill was taken to the Governor, who signed it 
without ceremoney the next week. 14 
The Bay Commission was now chartered by the state. The 
bond issue would be presented to the people in November. 
v 
The Act, whose short title was "The Narragansett Bay Water 
Quality Management District Commission Act" became Chapter 
342 of the Public Laws of 1980. In the preamble the Assembly 
found: 
" There exists in the Providence metropolitan 
area and Narragansett Bay severe water qual-
ity problems resulting from the discharge of 
•• 
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pollutants, convention~l snd unconvention-
al, into Narragansett Bay 
11 It is furthur found and declared that Narra-
gansett Bay may be the greatest natural re-
source of the state ... 
11 It is furthur found and declared ... that ... 
local government in the Providence metro-
politan area have been unable to cope prop-
erly and immediately with pollution dis-
charges ... 
11 It is furthur found and declared that the 
most efficient and effective method to com-
bat the discharge of pollutants is to create 
... a Commission ... to be charged with the 
acquisition, planning, construction, financ-
ing, extension, improvement, operation and 
maintenance of publicly owned sewa~~treat­
ment facilities in the ... District 11 
The Assembly chartered a"public corporation of the 
state having a distinct legal existence from the state 
and not considered a department of state governmenr. 1115 
It was granted the customary range of public powers, includ-
ing the ability to acquire land. 16The Governor was author-
ized to advance the Commission up to $3 million in state 
funds. 17 $250,000 was appropriated immediately to cover 
the Commission's start up costs. All money advanced would 
be repaid the state when the Commission was fully operative. 
The Act called for a Commission of thirteen members. 
Four were to be appointed by the Governor, two by the Mayor 
of Providence * one each by the Mayors of North Providence 
and Johnston (whose towns are also served by the Providence 
system). The Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority 
* This is a very sore point with Mayor Cianci's aides. They 
think the city should get more seats. 
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Leader appointed two apiece. The State Budget Officer serv-
ed ex-officio. This meant the Governor did not control a 
majority of seats on the Commission. 18 This was done quite 
deliberately, with partisan political considerations. 
According to Mary Kilmarx, the General Assembly did 
not want Mayor Cianci to have any control over the Commis-
sion should he be elected Governor.(this seemed a good pos-
sibility in the spring) So the Governor was given just five 
of thirteen seats to fill. This lead to a situation which 
embarrassed the Bay Commission to no end. 
The Assembly specifically charged the Commission with 
the responsibility to acquire the facilities at Field's 
Point. To this end the Commission was authorized to assume 
up to $14 million of . longterm debt carried by the plant. 19 
Essentially the city was to be reimbursed for its interim 
repair job. The Act authorized the issuance of $87.7 million 
worth of general obligation bonds to finance the reconstuction 
work. Of the principal the state would repay $73, 641,000; 
the Commission would be responsible foe amortizing the re-
mainder- $14,059,000. Should the Commission default on pay-
ing its share of the debt the state would step in and assume 
responsibility for it. Assuming no defaults, the state 
. . . . 16 20 would retire 84% of the bond issue, the Commission %. 
The Assembly set November 4, 1980, Election Day, for a 
a vote by the people on the bond issue. If the people de-
feated the bond issue the Commission would go out of busi-
ness on June 30, 1981, unless the Assembly decided otherwise. 
( 5 6) 
What would happen next was up to the people. 
VI 
Some supporters of the bond issue were wary of the 
public's reaction. After all it was the biggest bond is-
22 
sue ever sought by the state. The voters had not been 
kind to most bond issues in recent years. 
Trudy Coxe didn't have the confidence in the people's 
judgement in 1980 that she expressed in 1982. She was quot-
ed in the Providence Journal as being very worried about the 
referendum's prospects. Miss Cox e did not want a November 
referendum. She preferred a vote in late June when, she said, 
voters are more aware of water pollution issues. 
It is perhaps no great coincidence that the late June ref-
erendum is a traditional Rhode Island ploy to sneak through 
bond issues th~t are not regarded as popular. The convention-
al wisdom is that the hard core supporters of a question 
can carry the day in a predictable light turnout. 
Mary Kilmarx, quoted in the same article, eschewed Miss 
Coxe' calculated ingenuousness. She thought the bond issue 
didn't have a "chinaman's chance" in Novernber. 23 
Gary Sasse was worried by the lack of a centrally directed 
campaign for the bond issue. He organized a committee and en-
listed a public relations firm. Financial ~upport was sought. 
The Governor pledged his support and agreed to help raise 
24 
campaign funds. 
On October 1 the Journal reported the Governor's appeal-
(57) 
to the people to support the bond issue. 25 Garrahy was by 
this time assured of re-election; he had a glut of politi-
cal capital to expend on the issue. 
VII 
He could be assured because Vincent Cianci's campaign 
had turned into the most dismal flop of recent memory. The 
reason: Providence's shaky financial situation had finally 
started to become unglued in the summer. The details are 
not relevant to this story; it suffuces to say that the 
city was running out of cash and carrying a large, illegal 
cumulative deficit. The Mayor looked very bad since there 
was no denying he bore the major responsibility for the sit-
uation.I..ftheGovernor ever toyed with the idea of making the 
Field's Point mess a campaign issue (this writer has no idea 
whether or not he did) it was no longer neccessary. Cianci 
handed the Governor a much hotter issue.* 
The Governor enjoys the reputation as one of the nicest 
men in state politics. This did not stop him from going 
right for Cianci's jugular. He hammered after Cianci's mis-
management of the city's finances to great effect . Cianci 
sunk deeper in the polls with each new installment of bad 
news. On election day he was sunk for good, having never 
laid a glove on the Governor. 
VIII 
On election day the issues were decided. 403,765 voters 
* A fact Ronald Glantz did not care to mention when he 
talked about Garrahy's wish to embarrass Cianci. 
( 58) 
trooped to the polls that day. 26 Because every voting dis-
trict is equipped with voting machines the results for all 
but the very close races were known before midnight. 
Jimmy Carter won the state by a very comfortable margin 
of 43,000 votes. Garrahy humiliated Cianci 299,174 to 106,729-
a margin of three to one. Garrahy ran well behind must of 
the Republican ticket. He got only 17,000 more voteS then 
the totally unknown Republican candidate for General Treas-
urer. 27 
77% of the registered voters had turned out.28 They also 
gave a striking majority to the Narragansett Bay bond issue. 
It carried 215,614 to 103,069. 29 This two to one margin 
certainly constituted a mandate for change. 
True, 85,000 didn't bother to vote one way or another 
on the bond issue. Even if all of them had voted no the 
bond issue would still have passed decisevely. Why did 
this happen with nary a word of dissent? 
IX 
The bond issue was certainly an"apple pie" question. It 
was difficult to oppose without looking like a supporter of 
dirty water. Two people as disparate in outlook as Trudy 
Coxe and Ronald Glantz both agreed that no politician ''dared" 
oppose the bond issue. Both parties supported the state 
takeover, both in the legislature and the election campaign. 
If Mayor Cianci had any reservations he kept them to himself. 
(59) 
With no major politicians or important organized groups 
opposing the bond issue it was difficult for any opposit-
ion which may have existed to coalesce. Since 103,000 
voted against the bond issue (for whatever reason) there 
must have been some unhappy ·people out with some reasoned 
arguments against the idea. 
Supporters of the bond issue had a rallying point, ad-
vertising support and the unstinting enthusiasm of the 
state's major newspaper (made quite clear once again just 
before election day). Any opponents had no rallying point. 
If they existed they remained diffuse and unorganized. This 
major issue recieved so much support from the state's "mov-
ers" that it became a non-issue. Any opposition was smoth-
ered in the great big pillow of an awesome consensus. 
x 
With its thumping mandate the Bay Commission could pro-
cede to business. Trudy Coxe was typical when she thought 
the negotiations to transfer the plant were a virtual form-
ality that could be accomplished in a few months. It was 
not to be. The Commission quickly became bogged down in a 
political problem entirely of its own making. After extri-
cating itself from that mess the Commission had to deal 
with the city's obstrperous approach (and sometimes lacka-
daisacal approach) to the transfer negotiations. Occais~1 1."''f'J<:1i!.Y 
Cianci's inattention was understandable. More often it was 
(60) 
irritating. Almost always it was just plain baffling. 
As of March 1982 the city still had the plant with no 
firm transfer date in sight. Supporters of the Bay Commis-
sion are furi~us about this. Most people seem to have no' 
idea why this apparently simple task of transferring the 
plant from the city to the Commission is taking so long. 
That will be the subject of the next sections of this re-
port. 
( 61) 
Trouble Getting off the Ground 
Those who have read the work of Martha Derthick of 
Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky will not be surpris-
ed about what happened next. However, few if any of the 
actors in this little melodrama had ever read these minor 
sages; they shocked the transfer process was taking so long. 
The pattern is becoming well known. Poltiticians rush 
through a brand new policy and program designed to save the 
day (and their jobs) With a plan on the statute book and 
an appropriation in the budget, the movers retire from the 
field. Sometimes they recieve progress reports directly; 
often their information on progress is second hand. 
When the "stars" leave, as they inevitably must, the 
game is left to relative nobodies; obscure bureaucrats and 
interest group representatives who actually decide the shape 
of a program. In fact it is in their hands as to whether 
the victory that was won (with the passage of a new program) 
stays won. 
II 
With a famous victory won the Grand Coaliton broke up, • 
its members going their separate ways. Mayor Cianci returned 
to City Hall; restoring his tarnished political career was 
his obvious priority. Governor Garrahy went back to the 
affairs of state. Gary Sasse turned to other projects. 
Mary Kilmarx left the legislature. The Journal found other 
editorial subjects. Trudy Coxe thought the most difficult 
(62) 
part of the game was over. 
Things started to return to normal. The regular conten-
tious political process had been to a great extent overrid-
en when the sewer bonds were presented and approved. Now 
the traditional way of doing things was reasserting itself 
with a vengeance. The Commission, just a few weeks into its 
work>got stuck in a poltiical controversy that came close 
to discrediting it. 
III 
One of the first items of business for the Comm ission 
was to select legal counsel. The plant transfer negotia-
tions had to be prepared for and conducted. There were a 
myriad of jobs, large and small, associated with this task. 
Commission Chairman Joseph Turco, appointed by Governor 
Garrahy, estimated there was enough work to keep three 
1 
lawyers busy. 
Over thirty lawyers applied for the job. Only two were in-
terviewed- the only two candidates who were deemed serious 
prospects for the job: Anthony Bucci, Chairman of the Provi-
dence Democratic City Committee and Louise Durfee. 
On January 21, 1981 the Commission made its choice. 
Bucci got six votes, Miss Durfee five. Charles Mansolillo, 
an appointee of Cianci's (and the rising man in the Cianci 
Administration) voted for a third candidate. This threw the 
vote to Bucci. All four legislators voted for Bucci, as did 
the appointees of the Mayors of North Providence and Johnston~ 
( 6 3) 
IV 
The howls of protest from environmental groups and 
the Providence Journal was immediate. Its vehemence was 
startling. One man's anger in particular gave the protest 
force ·. : Governor J. Joseph Garrahy. 
The Governor, not a man to seek confrontation, swore he 
would use any means to dump Bucci. 3 He implied he would 
use his power to control Commission funds to deny Bucci 
4 his salarly. Garrahy seemed to take the whole thing per-
sonally. The next day, with the television cameras rolling, 
he didn't bother to make implied threats. He stated them 
clearly: 
" I'm going to make sure, if it takes years 
that that Commission is going to be put in 
place properly before there is any expendi- 5 ture of dollars by the state of Rhode Islana." 
He considered the whole thing a personal affront. 
" I resent the intrusion and politicking that 
is going on on that Bay authority and I 1 m6 going to do everything I can to stop it." 
It was an impressively angry performance by the Governor. 
Environmental groups led by Save the Bay were also angry. 
Trudy Coxe said: 
" We are urging you(state legislators) in the 
strongest possible manner to exert your in-
fluence and concern to correct the widespread 
impression that the representatives of the 
people ... will sit idly by and permit politics 
as usual to determine public policy on issues 
of enormous importance to the state."7 
The Journal needless to say, had some thoughts on the mat-' 
eer. The title of their editorial " Raw Sewage, Raw Politics" 
conveys the flavor of their dissent.a 
(64) 
It was pointed out that all of this might have been 
avoided had the Governor appointed his full compliment 
of members to the Commissiin9 (one seat was vacant) In 
the heat of the moment this little fact was glossed over, 
though it does seem to show inattention on the part of 
Garrahy (or rather, his staff). 
v 
The identities of the six commissioners who swung the 
vote to Bucci (two senators, two representatives and the 
men from North Providence and Johnston) made it plain to 
all but the green and the naive that some sort of Byzan-
tine deal had been cut. Since all six had some connection 
to Rocco Quattrochi, it was not difficult to see the fine 
hand of the new Senate Majority Leader somewhere in this. 1 0 
This left the questions: What was the deal? Who was it for? 
The Providence Journal quoting the usual unnamed sources, 
reported it was a straight swap between Quattrocchi and May-
or Cianci. According to the Journal reporter, Cianci agreed 
to acquiesce in the selection of Bucci (once an enemy of 
Quattrocchi's, but now an ally in his efforts to reunify the 
. 
badly divided Providence Democrats) 11 in exchange for Assem-
bly support for a bill that would validate the supplemental 
tax levy the city was imposing to stave off fiscal collapse.* 
* The city was not sure the extra levy was legal. It sought 
a special act to preempt any court challenges. 
( 6 5) 
This story was widely believed at the time. No other ex-
planation ever made the pages of the Journal. 
A person in a position to know told another story. This 
person can not be identified, but the story told made Roe-
co Quattrocchi's supposed role in the published accounts 
seem almost altruistic in comparison. 
According to this person it was indeed a straight swap-
between Rocco Quattrocchi and Anthony Bucci. The deal was 
mutually beneficial to both men. Bucci would become legal 
counsel (considered a "plum" job) ; in exchange Bucci would 
support Quattrocchi if he sought the Democratic Mayoral nom-
ination in 1982. Between them they could probably control 
the City Committee's endorsement.* 
It was a c lever plan. There was only one problem with 
it: Bucci's appointment had to be announced and explained. 
It was announced,but never really explained, at least not 
by the Commissioners who voted for Bucci. They contented 
themselves with counterattacks on their critics. Senator 
William Castor, a close associate of Quattrocchi's said 
it was"a fight the Governor had already lost. 1112Not quite. 
VI 
The story has the ring of truth to it. Cianci's appointees 
did not vote for Bucci. The Mayor denied making any deals. 
* The endorsement is the designation by the party organization 
of its favored candidate. Through the early 70's it usuaLly 
guaranteed the nomination to therec..ipient. In 1982 the 
endorsement went to Francis Darigan, who had already lost 
bids for Mayor in 1974 and 1978. 
( 6 6) 
The Assembly leaders made it clear they would not pass a 
bill to validate the tax levy. Speaker Matthew Smith was 
imsistent upon that point. The Assembly in fact never did 
pass a bill to validate the extra tax. The leadership's 
. . h . 13 position was t at it was unneccessary. 
VII 
Rantings from the Providence Journal and ravings from 
Save the Bay do- not sway too many hearts and minds on 
Smith Hill (location of the State House). Pressure from the 
Governor is another thing; and the Governor absolutely, pos-
itively insisted. 
VIII 
All of this made Rocco Quattrocchi eager to backtrack. 
The controversy he had stirred up obviously took him by 
•• 
surprise. 14 He and the Governor looked for a face saving 
way to ease Bucci out. (These talks tend to confirm that 
Quattrocchi was involved in this from the beginning) A form-
ula was worked out soon enough. 
It was simple. Bucci would keep the job, but would be un-
salaried. The Commission would retain a roster of lawyers; 
all of them would be eligible to do legal work for the Com-
mission. Bucci would be one of these lawyers. He would be 
il.5 
paid by the job. 
If everybody wasn't happy at least the fuss was over with. 
A short time later a bill was rushed through giving the Gov-
(67) 
ernor four more seats on the Commission. He now controlled 
16 
a majority. After making the appointments he retired from 
the stage once again, his second extraordinary intervention 
over. He hasn't been publicly involved since. The state's 
own budget difficulties preoccupy him. 
Now the Commission could begin its work. 
(68) 
On the Back Burner 
With the Anthony Bucci incident behind it, the Bay Corn-
mission could now get going in earnest. Chairman Turco es-
tirnated the Bucci episode set the whole transfer process 
timetable back sixty days. 1 That may have been true, but 
in the end the Bucci holdup didn't really matter. Every-
thing soon got so snarled that the events of January became 
half forgotten ancient history. 
II 
The city and the Bay Commission staffs prepared their 
respective bargaining positions. 2 It was hoped the plant 
3 
could be transfered by September. While this was going on 
the Bay Commission set about hiring a staff. The first per-
son hired was the first permanent Executive Director. 
The Commission chose Eric Jankel. Jankel was originally 
a staff member for Governor Garrahy's predecessor, Philip 
Noel~ When Garrahy became Governor in 1977 Jankel stayed 
on. Eventually he became head of the Governor's policy of-
fice. 
Jankel left to enter private business. He didn't stay 
there long; he left to become a top aide to Secretary of 
the Interior Cecil Andrus. When the Carter Administration 
went under Jankel became available. He took over at the 
Bay Commission in the late spring of 1981. 
* This writer did an internship in Governor Noel's office 
in 1975. Occasionally I worked for Mr. Jankel. 
•• 
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As a young "old pro" with credibility to both Democrat-
ic politicians and interest groups, Jankel seemed an ex-
cellent choice for the job. 
III 
Now the story must digress a bit into Providence politics. 
Events in the capital city were to slow things up consider-
ably ... 
Things were not good over at City Hall. In the spring of 
1981 the entire city administration seemed to come unglued. 
There was instabilty at the top. With the city going broke 
there was no permanent Finance Director. With city services 
under dis.pute the Public Works Director was under public 
attack by the Mayor himself (and soon fired) . Ronald Glantz 
left the city's employ to go into private legal practice. 
Glantz was replaced by the elusive Charles Mansolillo.* 
Things were so bad there were rumors (but never more) that 
the Mayor himself was thinking of fleeing to a post in the 
new Reagan Administration. Cianci denied these reports. When 
he did so he left few in doubt he would seek a third term in 
1982. This meant 1981 would be spent laying the ground work 
for that crucial poll. 
Providence's budget problems finally became the bona fide 
crisis newspapers like to headline. Missed payrolls loomed. 
* Mansolillo is a low keyed political chameleon.Originally 
elected as a Democratic Councilman he still serves on 
that body. He has since called himself an independent and 
filed for reelection in 1982 as both a Democrat and inde-
pendent, before finQlly running as a Democrat. The Mayor 
pays his chief of staff out of private campaign funds. 
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The city wasn't paying its bills. There was little cash on 
hand. Municipal bankruptcy seemed a real possibility. (Some 
·of the city's less responsible Democrats actually urged 
this) The banks were reluctant to make the usual short 
term loans the city needed to tide itself over. 
The Mayor of course couldn't let the city go under. It 
would surely end· ·his political career. Bowing to reality 
the Mayor let the banks call the shots. 
The Providence Review Commission was established in the 
late winter of 1981.* It took over direction of the city's 
finances. One of the things it recommended was a supplement-
al tax levy (already mentioned) to get the budget in order. 
The banks made passage of this extra .. tax a condition re-
quired before they would grant additonal short term loans. 
The Council, with a gun to its heads, passed the supple-
mental tax, but the public was livid. The Council had no 
choice since it was a non-negotiable demand of the bankers. 
It is no wonder the transfer negotiations were not a pri-
ority of Cianci's. Robert Chase, the Mayor's aide, confirms 
this. By the time the financial situation was put into some 
kind of equilibrium trouble broke out on another front. 
IV 
The Mayor had had a hist6ry over the last few years of 
problems with the city employees' union. In 1981 quiet hos-
* The Commisson consisted of prominent local businessmen, 
bankers and civic leaders. One of the members was Gary 
Sasse, who certainly gets around. 
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tility broke into open conflict. There were two city employ-
ee strikes. The second strike, which started in late July, 
turned out to be a total disaster for the union and a pol-
itical triumph for the Mayor. All the city's garbage collec-
tors were fired; the union had to swallow it. Trash collec-
tion would be done by a private firm in the future. This 
meant the city was out of the garbage business. This was 
to affect negotiations with the Bay Commission, though few 
noticed at the time. 
v 
Over at 57 Eddy Street (just behind City Hall) ,where 
the Bay Commission had set up business, all of this was 
watched with interest. After an early "intense start" 4 
negotiations had been in limbo for weeks. The Bay Commission 
could not seem to interest the city in serious talks. 
On June 28, 1981 the Bay Commission sent over a first 
d f h . 5 1 . h ra t agreement to t e city. It was now p ain t at some-
time in autumn was the earliest possible transfer date; late 
autumn at that for the city did nothing about the agreement 
for weeks at a time. 6 
This apparent indiffernece on the city's part baffled 
7 Eric Jankel. It seemed to him in the city's interest to 
transfer the sewage system to the Bay Commission and get 
it off the municipal budget as quickly as possible. 8 
If Janlel was baffled .J many were angry. Environmental 
groups couldn't understand the hold up. Neither could the 
press, when it cared to comment. 
(72) 
This time there were no interventions by anyone. The 
process would run its normal course. 
( 7 3) 
The Negotiations 
July 20, 1981 was notable for two reasons; it was the 
first day of the second city employees strike; it was al-
so the first time in a long time the city and the Bay Com-
mission had sat down to talk. The topic: the draft agree-
mey sent over to the city on June 28. 
Eric Jankel was not happy with the meeting. It was clear 
to him the draft agreement "hadn't been read" by the city's 
negotiators. 
The strike put the talks on the city's most remote back 
burner. 1 This was perhaps understandable.Yet once the strike 
was settled (in early August) the city still did not appear 
eager to get back to the table. 2 According ~~o Eric Jankel 
this was not due to any lack of effort on the Commission's 
part. 
In August Jankel gave a presentation to the Providence 
Review Commission. He gave the group a projection of the 
savings the city could realize by getting rid of the plant 
quickly.* Jankel was dismayed because he thought the whole 
issue "didn't seem important" to the city's officials. By 
the time the talks resumed ("around Labor Day") 3 it was 
plain the newest transfer deadline (November 1) wouldn't 
be met either. 




The distance between the Bay Commission's offices and 
those of Mayor Cianci are less than a few hundred feet. In 
terms of the progress made toward a transfer date the distance 
might have been as wide as the Grand Canyon. Progress would 
be reported during negotiations, but nothing seemed to be 
happening. Critics of the city found Mayor Cianci's public 
comments irritating.* This is not important. Cianci was em-
ploying traditional bargaining stances. What was important 
was the citys consistent lack of interest in winding up the 
negotiations quickly and getting rid of the plant. The 
Mayor sometimes appeared to be deliberately prolonging the 
process. A couple of months after the negotiations finally 
concluded Jankel was still visibly (if politely) annoyed 
with Vincent Cianci, He thought the Mayor's style"conflict-
ed with the public interest". 4a-:-
Jankel was critical of the city right down the line. He 
thought the Mayor's demands "posturing". (Robert Chase ad-
mitted this was true, but obviously didn't understand what 
the fuss was about) and thought the city was often not pre-
pared to talk seriously. Cianci did a lot of the negotiating 
hinself, face to face with Chairman Turco. Jankel was very 
critical of this. He thought Cianci should have left the 
* In public the Mayor consistently demanded a cash payment 
for the sewage system. An obvious bargaining ploy since 
Cianci, a lawyer, well knew a cash payment was forbidden 
by the Bay Commission's enabling act. 
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job of harrnnering out an agreement to his staff. Jankel 
thought Cianci's insistence on involving himself in every-
thing 5 smacked of "government by Czar". He also denied 
the charges of footdragging aimed at the Corrnnission by Rob-
ert Chase. 
III 
Robert Chase is . the City Historian and Executive Direc-
tor of the Providence Heritage Corrnnission. Ronald Glantz 
drafted him for "sewer duty''. When Glantz left the city1 
Charles Mansolillo asked Chase to continues to be the staff 
member responsible for this area. Chase, naturally, defends 
the city's conduct of the negotiations. He does not think 
the city's side of the talks was understood. He stated that 
the city's public stance was misrepresented. 
According to Chase the city was simply trying to get the 
best deal for itself- as was the Bay Corrnnission. The nego-
tiations were difficult for the Corrnnission was as determined 
to get its way as the city. 
Chase concedes the city's original demands were "outrag-
eous" - as were the Bay Corrnnission's. (According to Chase 
the Bay Corrnnission's first draft allowed them to demand any 
city property it wanted "including City Hall 11 ) 6 . He stated 
that environmental groups and newspapers which were critical 
of the pace of the talks did not or ·would not understand the 
nature of difficult negotiations.* 
* Trudy Coxe in particular drew Chase's ire. In the Warwick 
Beacon of September 29, 19?.: ;i .~iss Coxe was quoted describ-
ing the talks as "ridiculm:L!y slow" and suggested the 
city might be"deliberately negotiating in bad faith". 
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Chase believes the Commission dawdled. They took until 
June 28 to send their first draft agreement over to the 
city. He made much of this, since the Bay Commission was 
not distracted by budget problems and strikes. 
Chase wasn't directly asked, but he would no doubt deny 
the city talked in bad faith. (when asked this question a-
bout whether the city negotiated in good faith Jankel said, 
"sometimes yes, sometimes no. 11 ) 7 
It was suggested by one well place individual that the 
Mayor was recieving some remarkable advice: keep the 
plant, charge user fees and take on the rehabilitation 
project itself. In effect, tell the Bay Commission to "get 
lost". Chase denied this. He said there was no question 
the city would eventually transfer the plant. If the Mayor 
did revieve this advice and then taken it the result would 
have been very interesting . . 
IV 
Negotiations were"intense 118 in October and November of 
1981. An unsigned, undated memo from the early p arts of 
the talks listed what were to be the three main issues of 
the talks. (1) What compensation would the city get for . 
giving up its system? (2) What to do about the plant's 
incinerator, which did not meet EPA's clean air standards? 
and (3) What about the Inge Co. contract, a recently sign-
ed deal for the disposal of the city's trash and sludge? 
Compensation was settled amicably enough, after pro-
(77) 
tracted haggling. The Commission would assume 86.4% of 
the city's outstanding debt for Sewer Bonds issued in 
September 1980. This came to around $7 million. 10 The 
Commission also assumed $4 million worth of bond antici-
pation notes issued pursuant to another bond issue. 11 Al-
together the Commission agreed to assume over $11 million 
worth of the city's bonded debt. 12 
The incinerator was to be in compliance with EPA reg-
ulations before the Commission would take title to the 
plant. However, if the plant was not iru !compliance and 
this was the only obstacle to a transfer this requirement 
13 
could be waived. 
The Commission would not pick up the Inge Co. contract. 14 
By this time the Inge contract had become the major block 
to a transfer. It derailed the whole timetable one more 
time. What was all the fuss about? 
v 
On June 6, 1980 the city, acting with the approval of 
the Board of Contract and Supply, approved a contract with 
the Inge Co. At the time at recieved no attention. The 
c v r ~ 
agreement called for the city toAover its trash and sludge 
15 
to Inge for reprocessing into fertilizer or heating fuel. 
By the contract Inge would charge the city $25 a ton for 
removal of its sludge, with a minimum guarantee of $2,500 
16 
a day. 
The contract appeared to make s~ose for the city when 
( 7 8) 
17 it could supply both refuse and sludge. It was a bad 
deal for the Commission, for that agency dealt only in 
18 
sludge. An inflation escalator clause in the contract, 
which ran for ten years, could raise the annual payments 
to Inge from $1.1 million to over $7 million. 19 Eventually 
the Bay Commission , spoken for by Eric Jankel, made it 
plain the · contract would not be picked up. 
The financial aspects of the contract were not the on-
ly criticism. A consultant to the Rhode Is.land Solid Waste 
Management Corp. said a heavy lead content in the final 
product produced by Inge could contaminate crops and 
20 groundwater. 
Inge Co. is controlled by James Notorantonio. He made 
sure it was known his contract was going to be picked up 
or there would be expensive litigation to pay. 
VI 
Two important questions emerged: Who was Jim Notorantonio? 
How did this contract come about? Everyone around the Water 
Pollution Program wanted to know, yet no answers were forth-
coming. This writer~ researches uncovered no answers. Not-
orantonio is not a public figure; neither he nor anyone else 
connected with the city chose to explain the hows and 
whys of the contract.* In lieu of answers to these questions 
there was still another one to answer. Who was going to 
"eat" the Inge contract ? The City? The Bay Commission? Or 
* A Superior Court deposition James Notorantonio gave when 
he sued to block the transfer of the plant was very un-
informative about these questions. He obviously didn't 
care to talk. 
(79) 
James Notorantonio? 
The contract : ~alled for its obligations to be passed 
onto the city's "successors and assignees''. But the Bay 
Commission's charter gave it the power to pick up the 
city's contracts relating to the sewage system at its own 
discretion. It was clear the Commission wanted no part of 
Inge Co. 
Eric Jankel was very critical of the contract at sever-
al public hearings.He wanted no part of it in its present 
form. He wouldn't budge from this position. 
In a complaint filed in Superior Court, Inge Co. summed 
up its arguments: The contract was binding. Inge depended 
upon it to amortize its debt. Without the money from the 
. ld 1 f ·1 21 city Inge wou sure y a1 . 
Jankel was not very sympathetic to these arguments. He 
noted other city vendors were g~ing through the sane uncer-
tainties bothering Inge Co. No one had any guarantee the 
Bay Commission would want their services. Inge was just 
one of the pack. ''Private enterprize has a right to fail " 
22 he said. 
VII 
James Notorantonio finally emerged to talk about the 
problem. An entire meeting of the Providence Water Pollution 
Abatement Program Citizen's Advisory Committee was devoted 
to the issue. The meeting was very well attended. 
Notorantonio was all sweet reasonableness. He told the 
(80) 
meeting he was willing to compromise. He was ready to 
sit down and talk things over. He didn't want to pro-
long this lenghthy transfer process any furthur. 
Whether Notorant onio was sincere is not known. One 
thing is known. The City and Bay Commission did reach 
agreement. The Bay Corrunission would not pick up the Inge 
contract. What to do about it was the city's problem. 
VIII 
The city's problem was considerable. As of July it was 
out of the trash collecting business. When the Corrunission 
took over the plant it would be out of the sludge business 
as well. If the city were to be held to the contract it 
would have to pay $2,500 a day to deliver sludge and trash 
it didn't have. At $1.l million a year it added up to a 
neat little welfare program for Inge Co. 
IX 
The talks proceded apace. By November 1981 the major 
points had been decided, according to reports delivered by 
both Chase and Jankel to the Citizens Advisory Corrunittee. 
All that remained was detail work. Finally an agreement was 
harrunered out. 
On December 16, 1981 Mayor Cianci and Chairman Turco 
signed the agreement in principle. It encompassed the main 
issues plus many others that were not controversial. It re-
quired the city to adopt a system of mandatory user fees 
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before the Commission took title. A closing date of Feb-
ruary 26, 1982 was set. The ceremony would take place in 
the Mayor's office. The closing date could be put off 
until April 1, 1982. After that the agreement was off. 23 
Both sides gave some. The city got a large amount of 
its bonded debt taken off its hands, plus a four million 
dollar a year expenditure for plant operations. The Corn-
mission decided not to take a hardline position on getting 
the incinerat~r in good working order before taking title. 
The city allowed the Commission to walk away from the Inge 
contract. While not part of the formal contract it became 
clear the Bay Commission would help the city out a bit 
when it tried to walk away from the contract too.* 
Everybody seemed hgppy with the agreement. 
x 
With the agreement signed the ehd seemed in sight. There 
was little criticism of the agreement. Trudy Coxe was one 
of the few who were less then pleased with it. She was still 
upset about the time it took. She was unhappy with the "pol--
itical game" played by both Jankel and Cianci. 
She thought the Commission had ducked the issues. Miss 
Coxe thought the agreement should have covered future staf-
fing.(Jankel said the Commission wouldn't get involved with 
24 
staff issues until it took over the plant) She also thought 
* When Inge took the city to court to block the transfer 
of the plant in February 1982 the Bay Commission involv-
ed itself in the suit even though it wasn't a party. 
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a final settlement of the Inge contract should have been 
worked out. ( Jankel said, as far as the Bay Commission was 
concerned it was finally settledf 5she predicted the whole 
dispute would end up in court. (it did); this prospect of 
26 
more delay made her very unhappy. 
XI 
-rrudy Coxe never went public with her complaints. No one 
else was publicly critical. It remained to be seen whether 
or not the latest deadline would be met. It soon became 
clear it was not going to be. 
( 8 3) 
By and for Whom, or, Where were the People? 
In a democracy like Rhode Island's all actions of the 
state are by "the people", working through their elected 
representatives for "the peoples" welfare. Even the most 
blatant special interest legislation is justified by some-
one as being in the public interest. The controversy sur-
rounding the sewer system in Providence was no exception. 
Unlike most issues the public had actually spoken. No matter 
which way the 1980 Narragansett Bay Sewer Bond issue is in-
terpreted, it was a powerful mandate to preserve a treasur-
ed natural resource. The voters made this wish emphatic 
when they committed $87.7 million of their money to that 
end. 
Except for one short day at the polls the "people" have 
been conspicuous in this story by their abscence. Why was 
this? Were their opportunities for the "people" to get 
involved ? Would they have been listened to when they show-
ed up ? 
II 
There was a public participation program. In 1980 the 
city was in the design phase of Phase II of the facilities 
plan. ( This was going on under the city's auspices because 
the city still owned the plant. In mid 1980 a state takeover 
was still not certain) :i.e., what kind of hardware was going 
1 into the r efurbished plant? Federal regulations required 
the city to appoint a Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) to 
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advise the project managers, Charles J. Krasnoff and Assoc-
iates, (CKA) and the various engineering firms who had the 
contracts to evaluate and design various aspects of Phase 
2 
. 1 . . f II. Universa Eng1neer1ng,o Boston, was designing what 
would be for all practical purposes a new plant. Castellucci, 
Galli, Hayden, Harding and Buchanan were doing work on CSO 9. 
C.E. Maquire (CEM) was doing preliminary work for CSO 2. The 
record of the CAC advising these engineers was spotty. Dorn-
enic Tutella, Universal's man on the spot, usually smiled 
at advice and ignored it; Paul Sylvia of Castellucci, Galli 
made efforts to explain what his firm was trying to accomplish. 
He also tried hard to sell the CAC on building CSO 9 every 
chance he got. (since there was no guarantee it would be 
part of the final plans); David Wescott,of CEM, apparently 
listened as well as he explained. (which was very clearly) 
His f irrn was to come with recommendations regarding CSO 2 
which were so simple and inexpensive that some listeners 
were stunned. But that is running too far ahead of the story. 
III 
The original CAC was appointed during the summer of 1980.* 
It held its first meeting in the offices of Charles J. Kras-
noff; thereafter it moved tp its semi-permanent home in the 
committee rooms of the State House. At 29 members it was one 
* This writer was tenatively asked to if he was interested 
in serving on the CAC. This didn't happen, but the events 
it set off led directly to this project. 
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of the largest such committees ever set up in the entire 
2a 
country. This size was in recognition of the magnitude 
of the Providence situation. 
The CAC was a piebald group of politicians, interest 
groups and members of the public. During the time the CAC 
was the city's responsibility (October 1980 to March 1982) 
the Chairman was Dennis Nixon, a person wearing many hats 
as a URI professor and lawyer for the shellfishermen . . The 
firm of CKA got the public participation contract. They pro-
vided staffing, coordinated by Ezra Schneider. Some CAC "pub-
lie outreach" work was subcontracted to a consultant. The 
CAC was also fortunate to have the volunteer services of 
a URI marine scientist, Dr. Eva Hoffman. She was often a 
useful counterfoil to the engineers; she reminded the CAC 
that when it came to pollution of the Bay answers were be-
ing given when very little was known about the total sit-
uation. 
Some of the politicians on the !CAC were high powered or 
ambitous. Victoria Lederberg, a leader of the state Democrat-
ic Party and state representative from the East Side, was 
an original m~mber*. So was Steven Fortunato, a state senator 
just off an unsuccessful primary fight for Congress. Charles 
Mansolillo was a member. He was not yet the Mayor's top aide, 
but he was a prominent supporter of the Mayor on the City 
Council. Several lesser political lights also served. The 
* In 1982 Mrs. Lederberg is the Democratic nominee for 
Secretary of State. 
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rule of thumb appeared to be: the bigger the pol, the 
quicker the exit. One politician, a member of the North 
Providehce City Council lasted almost a year; most were 
gone in a few weeks, if not immediately (as was the case 
with Lederberg) *. No politician lasted the di~tance. Why 
is not known; perhaps it was because the CAC represented a 
major cornrnittment if taken seriously, with no prospect of 
a useful poltical payoff. Disputes over sewers are rot glam-
or issues. 
The ordinary citizens showed less tenacity then the pol-
iticians. There were some notabie exceptions, however. Miss 
Anna Louise Nestrnan, a very sharp old lady, longtime environ-
mentalist and League of Woman Voters activist attended all 
the meetings and made her presence felt. She persistently 
asked the question no one seemed eager to answer. It boil-
ed down to: "We have an idea what we need; now what can we 
afford and get an acceptable job done?" John Kellam, already 
mentioned, came to CAC meetings as an interested observer; 
when a vacancy occurred Mayor Cianci appointed him to fill 
it. He remained active with the CAC after his retirement 
from the city early during the winter of 1982. 
Russell Chataneuf, an engineer with the state Department 
of Transportation, also stayed with the CAC the entire time. 
He appeared to take the exercise very seriously. Another 
private citizen, Mrs. Deryl Johnson, also was fairly active. 
Predictably enough, the interst groups showed the most 
* In the case of Fortunato one observer said, " Fortunato 
pounded the table for a couple of meetings, saw no one 
in the press paid any attention, and quit." 
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staying power. Attending meetings was part of their jobs. 
Trudy Coxe and David Strauss were members, as was Edward 
Zesk, of the Rhode Island Hospital Association,and Dennis 
Nixon. Other groups sent people, if not always the same 
ones. Robert Chase was considered Mayor Cianci's personal 
emissary to the CAC. He usually smoked his pipe and said 
as little as possible. (a wise strategy for an emissary of 
any kind) 
IV 
A year after it was set up Chairman Dennis Nixon had a 
pretty negative view of the CAC. He thought it had"no im-
pact" and the participation was "illusory"; on the other 
hand he noted the CAC did bring all parties together at 
least once a month. The dislikes and turf disputes came out 
into the open. Nixon thought it was important for people 
to see and know that "Chino (K.N.Srinivasa, CKA project man-
ager) and Dom (Tutella, of Universal Engineering, the head 
designer of the rebuilt plant) hate each other's guts." 
Nixon thought the CAC acted as a good forum for state 
agencies to float trip.l balloons. The CAC "acts as a fall 
guy." Nixon thought it was a useful.job for the CAC to do, 
if not always a pleasant one. Over all this was not a happy 
view of the CAC's performance. 
Nixon was very unhappy with the media coverage CAC 
activities had recieved. For this be blamed the "inept 
nature of the contractor", CKA. 
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Nixon's unhappiness with the virtual privacy in which 
CAC business was conducted was not unique. Ezra Schneider, 
CKA's Coordinator of the Cormnittee was also unhappy; so for 
that matter was Eric Jankel. CKA did have its problems, but 
to blame the staff there for the blackout is unfair. 
v 
Two newspapers covered CAC activiites: The Warwick Beacon 
sent John Monahan, who usually attended. The Providence Jour-
nal sent a succession of people.( the most recent Journal 
reporter on the beat cheerfully admitted his near total ig-
norance of the issues at hand to Ezra Schneider) Radio re-
porters showed up on occassion. Television crews were the 
most rare. This writer never heard any of the radio cover-
age. The television reports were uniformly bad. The typical 
casual viewer could glean little of value from them. There 
was no way these issues lent them selves to the usual for-
mat of a local news program. 
This left the newspapers. The Beaco~ as already noted, 
usually sent Monahan. If he did aome a report of the 
CAC meeting or activity would usually appear in the next 
issue. Monahan's stories were reasonable efforts, consider-
ing he worked for a small newspaper and had other beats to 
cover. The Beacon, a modest effort which is published twice 
a week, obviously devoted a larger percentage of its resources 
to the story then did the mighty Journal. Warwick is a West 
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Bay community much affected by the sewage problems of 
Providence. This makes the Beacon's interest natural.The 
paper is little read outside of Warwick, however. 
This left the Providence Journal; its coverage was not 
consistent. It was rare a week went by without some Bay re-
lated story making its way into the paper. But the cover-
age was not especially informative. Stories regarding pol-
itical skullduggery ( Anthony Bucci ) , legal disputes (Inge) 
and trivia ( Eric Jankel's pension plan) were all covered 
and recieved good play. Complex stories like the transfer 
negotiations or the bureaucratic fight the spend the $87.7 
million bond issue are covered shallowly, if at all. 
Ezra Scneider, of CKA, made several attempts to persuade 
the Journal that the CAC was a usueful, interesting forum 
where some very important issues were being discusses. The 
Journal must not have been impressed by these arguments, for . • 
there was no regular coverage of the CAC. This is unfortu-
nate, for their editorial writers will almost surely scream 
loud if the rebuilt plant gives disappointing results. 
VII 
The obscurity of the CAC was too bad. The irony was a 
citizen desiring information could get it readily at CAC 
meetings or meet someone there· who could find out for them.* 
A particularly inquisitive citizen could easily become 
* As one participant said, " All the people in the world 
who really care about sewers in Providence are in this 
(the CAC's ) meeting room- all twenty of them !" 
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as did this writer, a sort of pseudo-insider. That is: 
well informed and trying just to observe, but influencing 
events just by being there . A classic social science 
problem known as the Hawthorne Effect) . 
This is not to say the public would have had a lot of 
influence. (unless they turned out in force, which was 
very unlikely) "Professionals" like to control their own 
games; they actively resent and obstruct intrusions by "lay-
men" into their activities. Engineers are as prone to this 
as any group. This meant the interested citizen was heard 
but often not listened to. In this writer ':s view, Universal 
Engineer was the worst"listener", C.E. Maguire the best. 
The engineers usually attended the public meetings and 
hearings of the CAC. Sometimes a presentation would be in-
teresting (usually CEM's); more often they were dull, with 
lapses into the imcomprehensible. The Washington Park pub-
lic hearing in April 1981 was the ultimate in pro forma 
events that were by anybody's standard a waste of time, save 
those with a perverse sense of humor. 
At Washington Park the subject matter was the new plant 
and CSO 9. Both would be located near the v1c:.1111 t_v , a form-
er ly solid working class area now showing the first signs 
of urban decay. The hearing was held in conjunction with 
a regular meeting of the Washington Park Community Associa-
tion. Th~re was a fairly well attended Association meeting, 
a raffle and ·then a presentation by the engineers. Unfortu-
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nately the raffle took place before the CAC hearing; after 
it was over most of the locals bolted, impervious to the 
pleas of CAC staff and others for them to stay. The meet-
ing was left to CAC members and staff, engineers and few 
groups of old women there to socialize till the hall closed. 
A few younger residents of the neighborhood stayed out of 
curiousity. 
This writer saw few sights more ludicrous that year then 
Domenic Tutella making his presentation ( which was too 
technical for casual observers) to a small crowd of happily 
gossiping grey haired old ladies and a few thouroughly con-
fused locals. Tutella made little effort to produce a talk 
understandable to an intelligent layman. 
The low point (or, depending on your point of view , 
the high point) of the evening was reached when Tutella 
and another engineer literally nearly came to blows over 
a matter of"professional disagreement".* 
More typical of CAC activities was the hearing held in 
the handsome, new Opportunities Industrialization Center 
(OIC) building in South Providence, the city's most decayed 
area. The CAC hearing, a full blown affair with a stenograph-
er, was the only activity planned. The CAC and its hangers 
on could have put up two fdatball teams; mem?bers of the 
public would have trouble mustering five people for a bas-
ketball game. while the necessary business on the stage 
* I never learned exactly what the near fight was all about. 
Tutella apparently thought the other engineer had made 
a public attack on his competence. 
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droned o n , the regulars at these meetings drifted in and 
out, getting coffee and gossipping in the lobby. They 
resembled nothing less than a typical meeting of a state 
legislature. 
The best meeting (in terms of informitt~~ ~ ~£S ' i it was, 
like the rest, poorly attended) was held in the auditorium 
of Women's and Infant's Hospital, in the Smith Hill-Davis 
Park section of town. Here the topic of discussion was CSO 
2. 
C.E. Maguire was studying this problem. Their team gave 
an interesting and effective presentation in which they de-
fined the problem they were going to examine (how the sew-
ers in their study area really worked and how much water 
actually flowed through them) ,their methodology,and how 
they would use· their data base to reach conclusions. They 
had the job 9~ reconunending whether or not CSO 2 was a 
priority. The Maguire show was so good it was repeated sev-
eral times by popular demand. 
VIII 
Most civil engineering questions can be described in a 
manner understandable to"layrnen". This allows for an in-
telligent decision, provided the explainer is trusted. In 
the case of Domenic Tutella, the designer of the rebuilt 
plant, trust or competence was not an issue. He simply was 
not responsive to criticism, especially if it came from 
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a non-engineer* 
There was an $87.7 million bond issue; Tutella brought 
4 in a design for an $85 million plant. CAC members and 
others questioned the wisdom of this, considering the un-
certainties about inflation and the availability of feder-
al funds. Miss Nestrnan often questioned whether the city 
could afford the "Cadillac" Tutella was designing. 
Other people, engineers with CKA 1were mindful of the 
CAC's comments. As a result they were making -efforts to 
hold down the cost of the new construction. 5 For a while 
it did seem as though millions were going to shaved off 
the design. Tutella,though, had a way of letting the cost 
of his plan creep back up. It is uncertain just what price 
6 
tag the final design will carry. ** 
Miss Nestrnan persisted. She wanted a cost effectiveness 
study done of some aspects of Tutella's plans. For $35,000 
Tutella himself would do the study- a sham procedure, since 




As one person said, "Dorn will smile for awhile, then pull 
out the knife." 
To stick with the "Cadillac" analogy, Tutella wanted to 
build a facility that was "loaded". It would have all 
kinds of extra capacity it would never need(in the judge-
ment of some CKA staff) . Some believed Tutella was over-
designing the plant to protect his reputation. 
At the last CAC meeting in March 1982 Miss Nestman asked 
when the Mayor would sign the order releasing the funds 
for Tutella's study. Appearing at the meeting later that 
night the Mayor told Miss Nestrnan (and everyone else) 
he had just signed it. Two weeks later it was still un-
signed. As one observer said,"He probably can't find it." 
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IX 
C.E.Maguire spent months studying the sewers of their 
district. It covered a good deal of the Providence length 
of the Woonosquatucket River. They gave regular, clear re-
ports about what they were doing. They seemed to be atten-
tive to members of the public who did speak up and members 
of the CAC. 
Their recommendations were startling: Don't build CSO 2. 
According to their researches there wasn't enough storm 
water running into the system for the CSO t~ work; it would 
be hydraulicly impossible. Caution was urged when it came 
time to clean clogged drains and catch ,iliasins. They had 
been plugged for so long clearing them would,in effect, 
create a new system that would operate in new, unexpected 
ways. The results might not be desirable. 
Maguire's team thought increasing the hydraulic capacity 
of the existing system and plugging up the numerous sewage 
overflows into the river would achieve very desirable re-
sults at a much lower cost then building CSO 2. 
Some were taken aback by this recommendation. Bay Commis-
sion staff in particular were surprised by it. Possibly peo-
ple accustomed to dealing with sewage problems whose sdlu-
tions called for huge expenditures of cash could not read-




The CAC did get some things accomplished. They used 
their little influence with the city to institute a pro-
gram to fix the tidal gates*. They also brought some need-
ed attention to a 14 million gallon a day dry weather raw 
sewage overflow. This turned out to be one of the more in-
teresting sub-issues of the CAC. 
The overflow resulted when a long length of sewer main 
finally became hopelessly clogged. The sewage couldn't 
reach the plant; it overflowed into the Providence River 
instead. For lesg than half a million dollars a "diversion-
ary structure" could be built which would bypass the clog-
ged line and send the sewage to the plant for treatment. 
Eva Hoffman strongly recommended this be done. She point-
ed out it would remove a major source of pollution no mat-
ter what. The improvement in water quality could be quite 
significant. 
CAC pressure finally got the city to show some interest 
in building this small project. It may actually get done. 
XI 
On March 10, 1982 the CAC held its last meeting as an 
organ of the city of Providence. Its federal money had 
* Tidal gates are just that, gates which close during 
high tide to prevent salt water infiltration into the 
system. Over the years the tide gates had been allowed 
to deteriorate to ineffectiveness. 
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run out. The meeting was held in the beautifully restor-
ed Aldermen's Chamber in City Hall. The Mayor himself 
gave it a sendoff. He did not seem sorry to see it go. 
The CAC had only been sporadically influential. The 
smaller the issue, the more likely the CAC could direct-
ly bring pressure to bear and get results. The city, led 
by the much maligned Cianci, actually made some honest ef-
forts to respond to CAC requests. (as in the matter of 
the tide gates) . 
The engineers designing the various parts of the rebuilt 
system listened to the CAC according to their temperments. 
Here the CAC was in a frustrating situation. They were 
heard by people. According to one person who knew 1 some ser-
ious back room fighting went on over what sort of hardware 
would go into the new plant. There were people trying to 
hold down the costs and they were responding in part to 
what they heard at CAC meetings~ Even if CAC could know 
this they couldn't see it. To all public appearances ·they 
were just another powerless ''talking shop". The engineers 
meanwhile, were culivating the people who will actually 
be making the decisions: the Bay Commission and its staff. 
After eighteen months the CAC was reduced in numbers to 
interest group representatives, city officials and a few 
citizens. The CAC was operating in an information fog and 
knew it. Trudy Coxe often complained that more study of 
the actual sources of Bay pollution was needed. She said 
that important decesions were being taken that were essen-
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tially leaps in the dark. At least one regular partici-
pant, originally not very sympathetic to this view, came 
around to agree with Miss Coxe. The misgivings of Trudy 
Coxe did not gather too much support- at least among the 
people actually creating the future program. 
The CAC was always doomed to a large measure of f rus-
tra tion. Popular interest in designing sewage treatment 
systems is just about nil.( Until the bill comes in) The 
issues were never well publicized. Even if they had been 
the result would have not been immediately intelligible 
to the man on the street. 
For all the money spent on the CAC* they never had a 
real staff all its own to develop and defend poisitions 
on the issues. To date this had meant no unified, specif-
ic stands on the major issues. It is impossible for busy 
people, meeting on the run, to hammer out credible posit-
ions on the issues. 
XII 
For all its failings the CAC served a useful purpose. It 
kept the game a lot more honest than it might have been h~d 
there been no one watching. For all of Dennis NiXt'.'l0' s unhap-
piness there was the chance for anyone to get involved. The 
CAC had no power to speak of; but it did have influence. 
The process may have been private (because the news outlets 
ignored its activities) but it was never closed or hidden. 
* Over $150,000 according to CKA 
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The CAC helped insure that accessibility (unused as it 
was) and if it did only that the effort was worth it. 
As Ronald Glantz said, the people only care about sew-
ers "when they flush their toilets and nothing happens." 
He is absolutely right. In the case of the CAC the public 
interest was looked after better than the people cared or, 
in truth, probably deserved. 
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The Endgame: Transfered at Last 
Trudy Coxe's prediction came true. Inge sued the city 
in early February to block the transfer of the plant. In 
keeping with the brief tradition of the Bay Commission, the 
February 26, 1982 closing cate was missed. 
It took a month for the case to be heard and decided in 
Superior Court. In order to speed things up the Bay Commis-
sion entered the -case on behalf of the city. 
On March 16, 1982 Judge Corrine Grande issued her decis-
ion. She rejected Inge Co.'s contention the transfer would 
cause it great harm. There was no proof of that, the judge 
decided. This program was too important to the people of 
Rhode Island to be delayed any furthur. Her temporary injunc-
tion to block the sale was lifted; their were no judicial 
1 
blocks to the transfer. 
One more obstacle remained before the transfer could be 
made. The City Council had to assess mandatory user fees 
against users of the system, arrange for collection of the 
fees and turn them over to the Bay Commission. 
The city balked and Mayor Cianci was the chief balker. 
He called the proposed fees "excessive" and made loud 
threats to veto an ordinance that was not to his liking. 
Meanwhile, the April 1, 1982 deadline came and went. The 
Commission, not wanting to call things off when they were 
so close to finally taking over, gave the city until May 1 
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to implement the fees. 
It seemed plain the Mayor was poised on the verge of 
making the user fees a campaign issue. He was in a tough 
three way race * for reelection and could use any weapon 
that came to hand. But in the end he didn't. 
Why he backed down is not known. What is known is that 
a fee shedule acceptable to him was devised. He set out 
to use his considerable local clout to pass it. He was help-
ed in this when some leaders of last year's unsuccessful tax 
revolt endorsed the user fees. ( Mrs. Rikki Sweeney is by 
no means an East Side type, thereby discrediting Chase's 
contention no one outside the city's "Silk Stocking" dis-
trict cared about the sewers) The Mayor was helped when the 
Governor quietly made some phone calls himself the persuade 
(or pressure) recalcitrant City Council Democtats. 
It was close to the deadline when the Council finally 
acted. A few days before May 1 the Council gave final pas-
sage to the user fee ordinance. The margin for passage wasn't 
even close at the end. The Council had come under enormous 
pressure in the end to pass the ordinance.** 
Qn May 1, 1982 the Bay Commission formally took title 
to the Providence semage treatment plant at Field's Point. 
It was the Commission's problem now, for better or worse. 
* Cianci actually lost, or rather conceded, the Republican 
nomination to East Sider~Fred Lippit, the House Minority 
leader. He chose to ran again as an Independent. The 
Democrat will be decided in a September primary. It is 
---a .. : t.ribute ::-t.:o ::_G1anci :--.th:at:::-.no~::-.on~scounts him out. 




With the Commission in charge the plant has not been 
in the news; the -~-s user fees have been controversial. 
Johnston and North Providence are not happy with the fees 
and are refusing to pay. The road ahead for the Bay Com-
mission is very rocky still; its job is unenviable. 
III 
Ronald Glantz has called the whole thing a joke from 
start to finish. If he is right, who was laughing? And at 
whose expense? 
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Conclusive Conclusions 
When the events of the last few years are examined in 
detail it should come as now surprize that the Commission 
has gotten off to such a poor start. The active proponents 
of a regional commission, in their eagerness to take advan-
tage of the 1979 breakdown at Field'S Point, .darted around 
the usuual obstacle course new state policies and programs 
have to negotiate. The flaw in the Grand Coalition was soon 
revealed: support for the Bay Commission was impressively 
wide, but it was not (with the exception of environmental 
groups) very deep. 
When the "crisis" passed the real mover behind the Bay 
Commission, the Governor, moved unto other things. This had 
to happen in any event. This left the matter in the hands 
of unknown bureaucrats, interest groups and the eity of 
•• 
Providence. 
The other mover, the Providence Journal, still covers 
the Bay Commission. But like the Governor, other things 
have moved to the forefront of their editorial agenda. There 
were still editorials denouncing footdragging and the gen-
eral slow pace of progress towards a state takeover,; but 
with no dramatic issue to give their position some power 
they had little effect. Mayor Cianci and his men were cer-
tainly in no mood to respond to "ProJo" pressure in 1981 
and 1982. 
The environmental groups are loud and their committment 
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was deep. They were heavily involved in the decision making 
process. But their own influence was not enough to 
force politicians to act. 
"Normalcy" returned to this iron triangle. The Bay Commis-
sion, brought into existence by the politics of the unv~1J .! 
had to deal with "politics as usual" when the dust cleared. 
This was brilliantly symbolized by the Bucci episode, which 
was Rhode Island politics at its most depressing usual. 
Politics as usual occurred at a more mundane level as 
well. Relations between the city and state were terrible 
from the beginning and remained so throughout. Both sides 
were exasperated and mistrustful with each other. Most of 
the public exchanges were civil; in private the antagonism 
was evident to this observer. It did not make it easy for 
the city and state to cooperate. 
II 
The city had cause for complaint; this does not excuse 
some of the city's behavior. They were,on occassion, victims 
of shabby treatment~ the city has never gotten proper cred-
it for getting the plant running surprizingly well. 
Yet it seemed to this observer the Mayor deliberately 
prolonged things into the election year. What was motiva-
ting the Mayor to be so uncooperative is unknown. He never 
went public with what he hoped to gain by all the confusion 
that surrounded the lengthy transfer talks. 
(104) 
III 
A lot of this could have been avoided by including the 
city in a positive way from the beginning. The Governor's 
failure (reluctance?) to consult the Mayor (a notably prick-
ly character, sensitive to slights) was an inexcusable lapse 
of good political judgement and even good manners. The task 
force should have been a joint city state venture. Some speed 
may have been sacrificed, but what of it ? For all the speed 
the Bay Commission built up in 1980 it did so only to hit 
the unavoidable muck of everyday politics at a greater speed. 
Possibly this got the Bay Commission bogged down even worse 
than it might normally have been. (Some problems would prob-
ably have developed no matter what). 
A joint city state task force recommendation for an auton-
omous regional agency would have meant it was supported from 
the beginning by both the city and the state.With the sin-
cere support of both sided things would have gone quicker 
after the referendum. It is difficult to see how things could 
have progressed much slower. 
IV 
Other investigators* have noticed the tendency of the 
system to swallow new programs whole. What happened in 
other times and pla .ces happened in Providence, Rhode Island 
in the 1980s. All attempts to evade the system fail for 
* Pressman and Wildavsky; Derthick 
•• 
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(short of revolution) the system remains and must be dealt 
with. 
This makes a typical claim that is heard when a program 
is disappointing, that it would work if we could avoid "pol-
itics as usual" rather hollow. The roof would never leak 
if it didn't rain. But rain it does, and the roof will leak 
if it's not tended to. "Politics as usual" is the roof that 
must be patched, the fences that must be mended. A state 
agency that cannot function in the normal political hurly 
burly ( which every society from Providence to Peking has) 
shouldn't have been set up in the first place. 
Over the last year and a half the Bay Commission has had 
to cope with normalcy. When it was created at abruptly set 
down in the political landcscape, some long t1me institution-
al arrangements were disturbed; new rules had to be establish-
ed. 
These things to not seem important to the casual observ-
er. To the people involved they are vital. It can seem triv-
ial and petty to the outsider- the same way families losing 
their homes to a new highway seemed unimportant to people 
who lived a safe distance away. 
To be critical when unhappy bureaucrats delay programs 
is a valid argument. To refuse to allow for such problems 
is self deception. It's. not good politics, planning or ad-
ministration. 
In the normal course of events changes in bureaucratic 
(106) 
regime take place at a slower pace and always out of the 
public eye. The new agency finds its niche in private, 
with none of the pain and jostling visible. What's out 
of sight might as well be invisible as far as the gener-
al public is concerned. 
Things moved slowly in Providence for two reasons. First, 
things always move slow, short of war. The routine civili-' 
an agency work just doesn't (and can't) get the undivided 
attention of the politicians who could prod it to action. 
(if they dropped everything else) Nothing is more routine 
and politically unrewarding than sewage treatment. No one 
is going to get much credit, even if a great job is done. 
The other reason things went slow is because the Bay 
Commission was set up so fast. The city could be ignored 
in the planning stage, but it could not be avoided in the 
implementation phase. Instead of winning the city officials 
over in the task force phase they (the officials) felt in-
sulted and ignored. An enemy was made, uselessly. If the 
players of the game looked at the events of 1979 honestly 
including Cianci's harshest critics) would they really 
be surprised at how things turned out? The wonder is that 
a transfer was worked out at all. 
· v 
The Mayor for his part deserves his fair share of the 
( 10 7) 
blame. It was reasonable, to a point, for Cianci to pro-
tect his political position. Politicians live to win the 
next election; Vicnet Cianci is no exception. 
A point was reached where the Mayor appeared to pre-
cede from self interest to shabby exploitation. It is 
plain the Mayor was playing, as Trudy Coxe complained " 
some kind of "political game". He abandoned whatever strat-
egy he was following only when it became apparent it was 
best for him to get rid of the plant. J ust what he thought 
he would accomplish only he and his inner circle know. If 
there was a legitimate public consideration the public 
should have been informed. If not they should know that, 
too. 
J 
( 10 8) 
Inconclusive Conclusions 
Now that the Bay Conunission has asaumed control of the 
Providence sewage treatment system it can start being eval-
uated in terms of its mandate: to clean the Bay's waters. 
Will it get the job done? Will there be a significant re-
duction of the pollution of the Bay's waters? If the Com-
mission does well its inauspicious beginnings will be for-
gotten. If not the whole idea will be seen as star crossed 
from the beginning. 
Nobody, of .course, has any idea what the Bay Commission 
will ultimately accomplish. That knowledge lies years in 
the future. No one promises great things, at least not in 
public. Ronald Glantz and Robert Chase are both very nega-
tive toward the Commission. Glantz said, " It's the biggest 
joke ..• it'll never work." 
Chase, upon hearing this remark agreed. " He's right." 
Are they right? It depends upon what you believe the 
public believes about what they were promised in 1980. Ron-
ald Glantz thinks the public was promised clean water for 
its $ 87.7 million. " Ask anybody out on the street what 
they voted for and that's what they'll tell you," Glantz 
said. In his view the referendum was an expensive deception. 
There is no way to know what the people think without 
a survey. Some people undoubtedly believe that's what they 
voted for. But no one pushing the Bay Commission promised 
clean water. They promised cleaner water. Or, in the caut-
(109) 
ious words of Gary Sasse, " The degradation will be halt-
1 
ed." In other words, things won't get any worse and will 
probably get better. 
Speaking less rhetorically, Glantz saw the benefits of 
the project as toosmall the justify the scale of recon-
struction and the amount of money to be spent on it. He 
attacked the regional commission and the sewer bonds as 
a project designed to benefit a very small number of shell-
fishermen and a larger (but still small) number of recrea-
tional boaters. Glantz pointed out it was events like the 
pollution of the Edgewood Yacht Club which ignited the first 
explosions which finally forced the Governor to act. Glantz 
made it clear he thought few Rhode Islanders cared much 
about the increased recreational opportunities they could 
not use without a boat. ( The day trippers will still do 
most of their salt water bathing in the lower Bay) 
Oddly enough, the state's best known advoctate for the 
Bay, Trudy Coxe, agreed with a lot of what Glantz had to 
say about the events that got the Bay Commission rolling. 
She mentioned the Edgewood Yacht Club incident as a major 
impetus to action. " It got people together ... ", she said. 
They parted company in matters of interpretation. Where 
Glantz tried to give the whole thing an elitist cast, Miss 
Coxe portrayed the Bay Commission supporters in 1980 as 
very public spirited. In the process she inadvertently help-
ed make one of Glantz' points. 
( 110) 
She stated, in making the point her organization(with 
its "ten thousand members" ) was responsive to public sen-
timent, " We talk to people, we go to the boat shows." 2 
II 
This was said without a trace of irony on Trudy Coxe' 
part. Are the people who go to boat the shows "the people" 
who matter in her eyes. We don't know. If Asked Trudy Coxe 
woul~ surely deny it. But the questions ~emain: Who is 
this for ? Who really benefits ? Who really pays? 
Ronald Glantz is prone to rhetoric and invective to ex-
cess. As a result his more perceptive comments tend to 
de overshadowed by his outrageous ones. He raised the is-
sue of elitism. This program is undoubtedly the brainchild 
of an affluent elite, so there is more than a kernel of 
truth to his charges. How much more? 
In The Environmental Protection Hustle Freiden point-
ed out a tendency by environmental groups to impose rules 
that fall disproportionately on others. In the case of 
California, Freiden concentrated on the increased housing 
costs which were causes at least in part by the no growth 
or slow growth policies imposed by California towns. 
Providence is a different situation. Here a state bond 
issue was carried by referendum. All apparently pay to 
benefit from an improvement in the upper Bay's waters. 
What could be more fair ? 
(111) 
But the fact is the people of the new treatment district 
pay twice, first through their state taxes and second, 
through their user fees. The Bay Commission will pay off 
16 % of the $87.7 million, plus $11 million of old debt al-
ready held by the city of Providence. In the future there 
will be new bond issues as the system demands new capital. 
For the rate payers this could get very .·expensive. Yet 
they will have no -choice but to pay the money necessary 
to operate and maintain the system. 
Its very well for the boat owner in South County or 
the shell fishermen to claim they help retire the state 
bond issue. Their share comes to pennies. The people in 
the treatment district are paying directly, in significant 
amounts. ( $55 a year per water meter or unit to start) 
III 
This is not an argument to forget the whole idea. Some-
thing had to be done about Field's Point. Any solution would 
have cost the public, even doing nothing. The interim re-
pair job is only,as Ezra Schneider said, "A bandaid." The 
question becomes: What is necessary to insure a system which 
keeps the pollution situation at an acceptable point and 
will consistently work ? This is a question which gets ask-
ed, but not answered. Anna Louise Nestman and John Kellam 
have asked it. Trudy Coxe has suggested on several occ~ssions 
that more studies be done of the total Bay pollution pic-
ture. Everybody admits were are woefully ignorant about just 
(112) 
what exactly is being dumped into the Bay. 
Without this data the question this paper has raised 
cannot be answered. In effect, the Anderson- Nichols fac-
ility plan of 1979 is being implemented even though it may 
be either a case of overkill or not relevant to the real 
problems.* 
It is ironic that so much money has been set aside to 
build a system and almost no money has been set aside to 
evaluate technological needs. This may mean a " Cadillac" 
of a system gets delivered to a system which would prefer 
something more modest. 
Ultimately anyone who cares about protecting the environ-
ment of this corner of the world can only shake the~r head 
and hope things turn out for the best. The way that has 
been chosen is the way that will be followed. Only a prophet 
could tell us the future; not to many od them are likely to 
be seen around City Hall or the State House anytime soon. 
One conclusion can be drawn from all of this, though: When 
the political world calls for a quick solution, the solution 
tends to be bought "off the rack". If it fits, fine; if 
not you either stay with an ill fitting purchase or take it 
back for possibly expensive alterations. 
* The 1979 Anderson-Nichols plan is not held in high re-
gard in some circles. Staff at C.E. Maguire claim some 
of the plan's data is just plain wrong. 
(113) 
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